Protecting the property of the mentally ill: the judicial solution in nineteenth century lunacy law by Stebbings, Chantal
PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LUNACY LAW  
Page 1 of 37 
N:\Repositories\Open Access\All REF Pilot Publications\Law\STEBBINGS\Stebbings_PROTECTING 
THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL.doc 
25/02/2013 
PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE JUDICIAL 
SOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LUNACY LAW* 
 
CHANTAL STEBBINGS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mental illness is a growing burden on modern society and the economy.1 Balancing the 
degree of formal protection imposed on the property and person of the mentally ill 
against that of personal control, responsibility and independence is a challenge inherent 
in conceiving and implementing an effective legal framework for the care of this sector 
of society. Contemporary legal provision and perception in this respect evolved from the 
legal and administrative frameworks established during the nineteenth century as a 
result of the rapid and considerable increase in mental illness during that period. The 
number of individuals recognised by the law as lunatics, the contemporary legal and 
accepted term for those individuals who had become of unsound mind but for whom 
there was at least the possibility of recovery,2 rose dramatically in the nineteenth 
century. Official statistics show that in 1845 the number stood at 25,000 with the figure 
rising to 77,000, by 1883, and to 124,000 by 1908. 3  The reasons for this increase were 
complex and various.4 Not only was the population as a whole rapidly increasing, 
doubling between 1837 and 1901,5 it was ageing. The increased life expectancy resulted 
in a much greater proportion of elderly individuals, many with problems of 
deteriorating mental faculties that were, for legal purposes, classified as unsoundness of 
mind. The intensity of industrial and commercial advancement experienced in the 
nineteenth century changed both working practices and living conditions. Long hours in 
physically challenging employment conditions, using substances that would only later 
be regulated once their effect on the nervous system had been understood, and living in 
often squalid and crowded conditions of extreme poverty with no amenities, 
contributed to levels of stress and mental illness. Furthermore, the changing 
demographics resulting from the rapid economic development of the early nineteenth 
century, notably the migration of labour from the countryside to urban centres, resulted 
                                                 
* The research on which this paper is based was funded by a grant from the British Academy, 
which support is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 See NHS Information Centre, Mental Health and Community, Mental Health Bulletin: Fourth 
Report from Mental Health Minimum Dataset and Annual Returns 2010 (NHS 2011); Mental Health 
Foundation, The Fundamental Facts, (Mental Health Foundation, 2007).  
2 Anthony Highmore, A Treatise on the Law of Idiocy and Lunacy, (London, 1807, repr. New York, 
1979, pp.1-14); H.M.R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy, 2nd edn, (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1890) pp. 10-21. 
3 Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers 1908 (4202) xxix 159 at para 646, p. 400 
4 See Andrew Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions: Madness and Society in Britain 1700-1900 (Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London 1993) pp. 334-74; D. J. Mellett, The Prerogative of 
Asylumdom (Garland Publishing Inc., New York and London 1982) pp. 47-85. 
5 From nearly 14 million in 1837 to over 30 million in 1901 (England and Wales): B.R. Mitchell and 
P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, (Cambridge University Press, 1962) pp. 6-7.  
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in the breakdown of networks of family support, which were consequently not available 
to mitigate either the effects of the social and economic changes on individuals, nor the 
burden on the state to care for afflicted individuals.6  
  The response to this severe social problem was the orthodox one the Victorian 
state adopted with respect to all such challenges. Public health, education, working 
conditions and poverty were just some instances where the forces of the state were 
mobilised to effect wide-ranging and often radical social reforms.7  Only the intervention 
of the state could address the enormity of the lunacy problem. Adopting the Benthamite 
model of identification of the social evil, followed by intensive official empirical 
investigation, reforming legislation and its implementation by an organ of varying 
degrees of independence from the executive, lunacy was brought fully within the ambit 
of state regulation in 1845. The legislation addressed essentially the certification, 
detention and protection of the persons of the insane, irrespective of their property. It 
aimed to end abuse, ensure that individuals were admitted only to licensed premises on 
the correct orders and certificates,8 and to provide institutionalised care for pauper 
lunatics in public county asylums.9 The permanent bureaucratic organ of regulation was 
the Lunacy Commission,10 with the responsibility of regulating the detention of lunatics 
and supervising their care. In line with other contemporary policies of centralisation, the 
Lunacy Commission was an independent, advisory and reporting authority, with the 
implementing bodies being the local magistrates.  
Social and humanitarian needs ensured this administrative framework was 
directed to the protection of the insane poor, because the very great majority of lunatics 
were categorised as pauper lunatics. When the total number of lunatics stood at some 
71,000 in 1880, 90% were paupers maintained at the public expense, with the remaining 
10% being maintained from their own resources.11 And yet, while an increase in the 
number of the insane was a tragic unforeseen and unwelcome consequence of the 
industrial revolution, a desired outcome of rapid economic development was an 
immense growth in national wealth.12  Furthermore the distribution of this wealth 
adopted a new pattern. It was less polarised, permeating the social classes to a greater 
                                                 
6 See generally Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, 3rd edn. (Palgrave: 
Macmillan, 2003). 
7 See generally A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England 
during the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edn, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1940); David Roberts, 
‘Jeremy Bentham and the Victorian Administrative State’ 2  Victorian Studies 193-210 (1959); 
William C. Lubenow, The Politics of Government Growth (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 
1971). 
8 An Act for the Regulation of the Care and Treatment of Lunatics 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 100). 
9 Lunatics Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c.126). See J.K. Walton, ‘Casting out and bringing back in 
Victorian England: pauper lunatics 1840-70’ in W.F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd 
(eds) The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry, 3 vols., (Tavistock Publications, 
London, 1985) vol. 2, pp.132-146. 
10 See generally, D. J. Mellett, ‘Bureaucracy and Mental Illness: the Commissioners in Lunacy 
1845-90’, 25 Medical History (1981) 221-50. 
11 C. Lockhart Robertson, Lunacy in England: England’s Irren-Wesen, (LSE Selected Pamphlets: 
1880) p. 1. 
12 M. J. Daunton, Progress and Poverty (Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 125-45; Martin Daunton, 
‘Society and economic life’ in The Nineteenth Century, Short Oxford history of the British Isles, 
Colin Matthew (ed), (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 41-82. 
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degree than ever before and responsible for the creation of a new propertied middle 
class.13 The interaction of these two social and economic phenomena inevitably resulted 
in the significant increase in the mentally ill of small property.  
The extent of property ownership of individual lunatics was clearly as varied as 
in the rest of the population. All strata of society included unfortunate individuals who 
had, from a variety of causes not then fully understood by medical science, lost their 
sanity as it was then conceived. From the middle of the nineteenth century the great 
majority of the lunatic population consisted of the mentally ill received into 
institutionalised care as a result of reception orders made on the certificates of medical 
practitioners and a justice of the peace, popularly known as ‘certified’ lunatics. Not all of 
these were paupers in the strict legal sense being in receipt of parish relief. It was rather 
that their insanity made it impossible for them to continue to earn their living and so 
could not afford treatment in a private asylum. The fact that an individual was in 
immediate need of this kind of treatment and could not afford it, sufficed to bring that 
person within the meaning of pauper for the purposes of the lunacy legislation. 14 Others 
were not wealthy but were able to pay for care in a private asylum or the private wing of 
a state pauper asylum.  The Annual Reports of state asylums and the records of private 
asylums reveal a significant proportion of professional individuals, skilled craftsmen, 
shopkeepers, farmers, clergymen, army and naval officers, and their wives or widows, 
among their patients. 15 Official reports suggest that such individuals often possessed 
small estates, of perhaps £500 or £1000 in capital value, yielding between £50 and £100 
income a year, or incomes up to about £200 pa.16 Although as individuals they were 
rarely wealthy, collectively they were worth some £1 million per annum, produced by a 
capital sum of several millions. 17   
It had always been understood that the property of the mentally ill needed to be 
protected. Where it was not possible for the mentally ill to be maintained by advances 
from friends or relatives,18 a course that difficulties of capacity and title made desirable, 
the patient’s property would be managed by his family as well as they could, though 
such management was inevitably difficult, irregular and haphazard. In practice, in most 
cases, the lunatic’s family and friends managed the property genuinely for the patient’s 
                                                 
13 See generally M. J. Daunton, Progress and Poverty (Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 198-201; 
Norman McCord, British History 1815-1906, Short Oxford history of the Modern World, J. M. 
Roberts (ed) (Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 98-107). 
14 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c.5) s.18; Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy 
Law, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, qq. 7723-27; 7809 per Dr Maury 
Deas, Medical Superintendent of a county public asylum. 
15 See for example the annual reports of the Surrey Lunatic Asylum between 1843 and 1850: 
London Metropolitan Archives [hereafter LMA] H46/SP/A/02/001-2. See too Minutes of 
Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
(1877) (373) xiii 1, qq. 7943, 7973 per Richard Adams, superintendent of the Cornwall Asylum at 
Bodmin. 
16 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1877) (373) xiii 1, qq. 5773-4 per William Parkinson, Master of the 
Workhouse at Bermondsey. 
17 Further Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1847-8 
(858) xxxii 371 at 438.  
18 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1877) (373) xiii 1, q. 10837 per Charles Wilde, Registrar in Lunacy. 
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benefit, did not defraud him and used the property properly to ensure he was looked 
after and his estate was preserved. However there were no sanctions if this obligation, 
which was no more than a moral duty, was abused. Abuse ranged from expenditure 
which was not strictly for the benefit of the lunatic, to downright fraud and theft, a 
practice that was easy where ready cash and disposable chattels were concerned. 
Instances of misappropriation were numerous. For example, it was well known that 
many lunatics were given very small allowances by their families, even though there 
was plenty of available income, so that the heir and next of kin would benefit from a 
larger inheritance. Property was equally vulnerable to dissipation through management 
that was honest but incompetent. It was also understood that the law should protect 
lunatics from squandering their property either through their own lack of judgment or 
through their exploitation by third parties. The evidence suggests that such unilateral 
squandering of money was relatively rare, mainly because members of the individual’s 
family were generally sufficiently interested to interfere at an early stage to prevent it.19 
The greater danger was the unscrupulous abuse of the mentally ill by third parties, by 
‘designing persons who plundered’ them.20 Undoubtedly, and most importantly, the 
ownership of substantial property provided a strong motive for improper detention as a 
lunatic by the family and pecuniary misappropriation,21 and a strong argument for 
special supervision.  
The connection of these two factors – the need for legal safeguards to protect the 
property of the mentally ill from abuse, and the growth in the numbers of mentally ill 
individuals with small properties – created a significant challenge to the nineteenth 
century legal order in lunacy. The aim of this article is to explore how this challenge was 
met, which solution was adopted to address the problem of small estates and, in so 
doing, to assess the extent to which the Victorian legislature and judicature 
demonstrated a real commitment to ensuring the protection of the smaller properties of 
the increasing numbers of middle and working class mentally ill. It examines how, if at 
all, the mentally ill with small estates were able to establish themselves in the turbulent 
regime of lunacy law administered by two parallel and distinct systems rife with 
jurisdictional tensions. It discusses whether the paternal and esoteric jurisdiction of the 
Lord Chancellor in lunacy was appropriate to the new social and economic conditions 
and whether it was accessible to patients of small property. It queries how far the 
creation of a bureaucratic structure for the management of lunacy addressed the issue of 
property ownership and explores the interaction between the state’s regulation of lunacy 
and the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities in this respect at a time when fundamental 
principles of jurisdiction in this field of social and legal development were being 
formulated. By identifying the conflicts and tensions, and examining the imperatives 
                                                 
19 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 2984 per T.H. Fischer, 
Master in Lunacy. 
20 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 2985 per T.H. Fischer, 
Master in Lunacy. 
21 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 29599 per Sir James 
Crichton-Browne, Lord Chancellor’s Visitor in Lunacy. See too Roy Porter, Mind Forg’d Manacles 
(Athlone Press, London, 1987) pp. 112-14; 148-55. 
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that drove the development of the law to their resolution, this article reveals a new 
perspective on the attitude of the judiciary towards the movement for state intervention 
in lunacy in nineteenth century England.  
 
 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR 
 
So evident was the danger of pecuniary misappropriation, and so obvious the need to 
protect lunatics’ property, that a specialised legal regime developed to do so. It was 
ancient and was derived from the royal prerogative.22  As parens patriae the king had the 
right and duty to care for those incapable of looking after themselves, and since lunatics, 
like children, were inherently vulnerable, they clearly required the protection of the 
law.23  The king delegated this jurisdiction, whose origins Sir Henry Theobald admitted 
were ‘lost in the mists of antiquity’,24 to the Lord Chancellor personally. 25 From 1842, as 
a result of the reforms of Lord Lyndhurst,26 this jurisdiction was exercised in a 
department quite separate from the Court of Chancery, known variously as the Lunacy 
Department, Office, or Court. This administrative distinction reflected the nature of the 
jurisdiction itself, which was accepted as quite separate from that of Chancery.27 Though 
nowhere stated, the jurisdiction came to concentrate almost exclusively on the property 
of persons of unsound mind.28  It was declared in a statute of 1324 entitled De Prerogativa 
Regis, which stated that the lands of lunatics ‘shall be safely kept without Waste and 
Destruction, and that they and their Household shall live and be maintained 
competently with the Profits of the same, and the Residue besides their Sustenation shall 
                                                 
22 See F. W. Maitland, ‘The “Praerogativa Regis”’, 6 English Historical Review 367-72 (1891); H.S. 
Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (London, Stevens & Sons, 1924) pp. 1-9. 
23 The jurisdiction was clearly founded on necessity. See Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 
1 at 20 per  Lord Eldon. 
24 Sir Henry Theobald was Master in Lunacy from 1907-22: H. S. Theobald, The Law Relating to 
Lunacy (London, Stevens & Sons, 1924) p. iii. He suggests that it was taken from the feudal lords 
by Edward I, either by consent or by a statute no longer extant (ibid p.1). For the early history of 
lunacy jurisdiction see W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 1 (Methuen & Co, London, 
1903) pp. 261-63; Sir F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd edition, 2 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898 reissued 1968), vol. i p. 481. See too Sallyanne 
Payton, ‘The Concept of the Person in the Parens Patriae Jurisdiction over Previously Competent 
Persons’, 17 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 605-645 (1992). 
25 The jurisdiction was transferred to the Court of Wards and Liveries when that court was 
created in 1540 by 32 Hen VIII c. 46 and remained there until 1660 when the Act 12 Car II c. 24 
transferred exercise of the royal prerogative over idiots and lunatics to the Lord Chancellor. By 
the middle of the nineteenth century the jurisdiction could be exercised by anyone for the time 
being entrusted by virtue of the sign manual, and by the dawn of the twentieth century, nine 
judges were exercising the jurisdiction – the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, five Lords 
Justices and two Masters. See H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2nd edn. 1890) pp. 21-29. 
26 See J. B. Atlay, The Victorian Chancellors 2 vols., vol. 1 p. 140 (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1906)  
27 See the statement of James LJ where he famously observed that ‘[U]nsoundness of mind gives 
the Court of Chancery no jurisdiction whatever’:  Beall v. Smith (1873) LR 9 Ch App 85 at 92.  
28 The early law shows that it was not limited to property: see Lord Coke in Beverley’s Case (1603) 
4 Co Rep 123b at 126a-b. 
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be kept to their Use, to be delivered unto them when they come to right Mind.29  As a 
lunatic was, by definition, presumed to be capable of recovery, the statute made it clear 
that the king could take nothing for himself from the lunatic’s land. He could never be 
more than a trustee, to protect the lunatic’s real property and account to him for all the 
profits of the estate on his recovery or, if he did not recover, to his heirs on his death. 30  
The inherent jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor over the property of lunatics 
was, in legal theory, unlimited and incapable of definition.31 Its scope was discussed in a 
case on wardship in 1828, where Lord Redesdale drew the analogy between the 
jurisdiction over infants and that over the mentally incompetent and observed that it went 
‘as far as is necessary for protection and education’.32 What was clear was that the 
jurisdiction was to be exercised for the benefit of the individual. The Lord Chancellor 
had to administer the property so as to keep it safe, to protect it from risk and hazard, 
and in the interests of the lunatic who owned it.33 The court aimed to represent the 
lunatic himself as far as possible, to ‘supply the place in society and the state which his 
withdrawal has rendered void’.34 The court was his ‘mind and soul’ and in its practice it 
acted as a ‘prudent and occasionally selfish man of the world’; it was ‘tentative and 
unadventurous, open-handed, to avoid probable loss; sparing, to make possible gain; 
supremely concerned for his own comfort, and disregardful of the interests and 
expectations of others’.35 
Throughout the nineteenth century this jurisdiction was made more explicit 
through its declaration in statute, a clarification which was beneficial to the lunatics and 
their legal advisers in the administration of their estates in lunacy.   The Infants’ 
Property Act 183036  permitted the property of lunatics to be sold or charged to pay 
debts, discharge incumbrances and pay for the costs of obtaining a commission in 
lunacy,  and the Property of Lunatics Act 1852 extended the the Lord Chancellor’s 
power to any estate or interest of the lunatic in land or stock, in reversion or remainder 
or expectancy, in order to authorise the payment of any expenditure made or debt 
incurred for the maintenance or otherwise for the benefit of the lunatic, and payment of 
his expenses of maintenance.37 The statutory articulation of the Lord Chancellor’s 
powers over lunatics’ property continued in the following year, when the Lunacy 
Regulation Act 1853 was devoted almost entirely to the subject. It gave the Lord 
Chancellor the widest powers to manage a lunatic’s estate and to go beyond mere 
powers of management in that the court was given the power to sell or mortgage the 
                                                 
29 17 Edw II c. 10 (1324). This short Act is called the Lands of Lunatics Act in the Chronological 
Table of Statutes. 
30 Frances’ Case (1537) Moore K.B. 4; Prodgers v Frazier (1684) 3 Mod 43. The legal position of idiots, 
who by law were presumed to have been born with a mental disability and be incapable of 
recovery, was quite different: see the Lands of Idiots Act, 17 Edw II c. 9 (1324). 
31 Wellesley v Wellesley (1828) 2 Bli NS 124 at 142-3 per Lord Manners. 
32 Wellesley v Wellesley (1828) 2 Bli NS 124 at 136 per Lord Redesdale. 
33 Oxenden v Lord Compton (1793) 2 Ves Jun 69 at 73 per Lord Loughborough LC. 
34 H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy, 2nd edn, (Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1890) p.158. 
35 H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy, 2nd edn, (Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1890) p.158. 
36 11 Geo. IV & 1 Will. IV c. 65.  
37 Property of Lunatics Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict c. 48) s. 1. 
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corpus of the lunatic’s estate in land or stock, whatever the nature of the interest, in 
order to raise money to be applied towards the payment of his debts, the discharge of 
any incumbrance on his estate, the expense of his current and future maintenance and 
the expenses of the inquisition.38 The Act permitted, with the sanction of the Lord 
Chancellor, the conveyance of land in the performance of a contract, of partnership 
property, the sale, partition or exchange of land in which the lunatic had an undivided 
share, the sale of land for building purposes, the assignment of business premises, the 
disposition of an undesirable lease, and the granting of building and other leases.39 The 
full extent of the Lord Chancellor’s powers to manage and administer the property of 
lunatics was explicit in the Lunacy Act 1890.40 
The law’s exclusive focus on the protection of lunatics’ property rather than the 
condition of their lunacy or the protection of their person was significant and clearly 
revealed the priorities and values of both medieval and modern legislators. In their 
terms, however, the statutory provisions did not limit the Lord Chancellor’s protection 
to any size of estate. Indeed, De Prerogativa Regis was widely worded to include all 
lunatics with any amount of property, the wealthy and modest. In all circumstances, the 
Crown had a legal duty to protect the property of a lunatic. But what came to be a 
material factor in terms of the size of a lunatic’s estate was the availability of the Lord 
Chancellor’s protection under his inherent jurisdiction only to those lunatics ‘so found’, 
a limitation which lasted until 1908. A lunatic ‘so found’ was one who had been judged 
of unsound mind so as to be incapable of governing himself and his affairs41 by a trial 
known as an inquisition, the writ for which issued from the Chancery.42 Lunatics ‘so 
found’ were accordingly generally known as ‘Chancery lunatics’.  The inquisition 
process began with a petition to the Lord Chancellor made by a friend or relative of the 
alleged lunatic, accompanied by the findings of qualified medical practitioners and 
details as to the lunatic’s circumstances and property. The petition was heard by the 
judge in chambers, and if there was a prima facie case, he would order an inquiry to be 
held by officers of the lunacy court with a jury. This inquisition was held in the lunatic’s 
home or his asylum, often in his presence, and frequently with the attendance of 
counsel, but it was an open court at which the public was entitled to attend. 43  If the 
inquisition found that the patient was of unsound mind and incapable of managing his 
affairs, the court would ascertain the extent of his or her property and the income arising 
from it, identify the heir and next of kin and ensure the protection of the person and 
property.44 All this, including the history and nature of the lunacy, had to be reported 
                                                 
38 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s.116. 
39 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) ss. 122-134. 
40 53 Vict. c. 5 ss. 116-143.  
41 Danby P. Fry, The Lunacy Acts (London, Knight and Co., 1864) pp. 5-6. 
42 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1783 edition printed for W. Strahan 
and T. Cadell, London and D. Prince, Oxford, 4 vols., (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1978), 
vol. iii at p. 427. 
43 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 qq. 968; 972 per Francis Barlow, Master in Lunacy.  
44 For this second stage in the process, see Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on 
Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 qq. 999-1009. At the 
end of the nineteenth century the procedure for the judicial inquisition as to lunacy was found in 
the Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) ss. 90-107.  
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formally to the Lord Chancellor for his approval. If the lunacy was not contested, he 
would simply countersign the report.45   
The effect of a finding of lunacy by inquisition on the individual’s property was 
profound46 and the protection it afforded, with one exception,47 was highly effective. 
Although the court was not the owner of the lunatic’s estate, merely its guardian or 
trustee, from the moment of the finding the lunatic so found would be unable to make a 
valid disposition of his property. He was ‘deprived…of the power of squandering his 
property’.48  It was the judicial authority which took a complete and informed control of 
the lunatic’s property.  The court was the ‘protector’49 and ‘guardian’50 of the lunatic’s 
property and it made every arrangement relating to it.  While an allowance was given to 
maintain the lunatic, and any surplus paid into the court and invested in Consols and 
accumulated to his credit, the day to day management of his property was in the hands 
of the ‘committee of the estate’ who was a single individual, often a relative,51 appointed 
by the court. The committee of the estate was the public expression of the court’s 
protection of the lunatic’s property, because his powers were strictly limited.  The 
lunatic’s property did not vest in him, and he was in the position of a mere bailiff, with 
power only to act as ‘the legal hand to pay and receive all money’,52 and he could do 
nothing with the corpus of the property without the order of the court. Every transaction 
including every payment, sale, lease or repair was executed by the committee in the 
                                                 
45 For a fully documented inquisition and subsequent proceedings, see LMA ACC/1156/071. 
46 The consequences went far beyond the individual’s property. His very status was altered: he 
could be detained on the instruction of the committee of his person; he could not execute a valid 
deed even during a lucid interval, and he could not contract a valid marriage without the consent 
of the Lord Chancellor. He was, in all but name, a ward of court. See generally Minutes of 
Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 28409-10, 28489, 28556-7 per 
Cozens-Hardy LJ.  
47 The exception was the maintenance allowance. The committee of the person was given the sum 
for maintenance, but once he had given the court a receipt for that sum, there was no control at 
all over how he spent it and he had no duty to account for the way he used it. Statistics showed 
that in a great many cases the income of the lunatic far exceeded the amount allowed to his 
committee for his maintenance and that of his dependants, and in many cases cited by 
contemporaries the amount for maintenance was half, or even a quarter, of the total income: 
Richard Saumarez, An Address on the Laws of Lunacy for the Consideration of the Legislature (J. 
Ridgway, London, 1854) pp. 4-6 and the anecdotal evidence at p. 9. This constituted one aspect of 
the Chancery lunatic’s property that the legal regime failed to protect: Minutes of Evidence 
before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1859, session 1) 
(204) iii 75 qq. 1168-85; qq. 1214-32 per Francis Barlow, Master in Lunacy.  
48 Parliamentary Debates series 3, vol. 126, 2 May 1853 (HL) col. 903. Control was restored to the 
patient only when and if he regained his sanity and the commission was formally superseded by 
the issue of the writ supersedeas. 
49 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 1186. 
50 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, q. 11077 per Francis Barlow, Master in Lunacy. 
51 A committee of the person would be appointed to take responsibility for the lunatic’s personal 
care. 
52 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 1147.  
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name of the lunatic but not before it had been expressly and formally authorised by the 
judge following the submission of evidence that the transaction was appropriate. For 
example, in one case where a railway was proposed near the lunatic’s home, the 
committee of the estate saw a business opportunity to sell some of the lunatic’s land for 
building leases. He had to put his proposal to the court, and had to support it fully with 
affidavits from himself and from experts such as surveyors and valuers to ensure that 
the lunatic’s interests were fully safeguarded.53 Similarly, when the same committee 
proposed to sell some of the lunatic’s residential properties in London on his behalf, a 
surveyor experienced in the valuation of property in the area was employed to ensure 
the sale price represented the full value of the property.54The committee of the estate 
was indeed ‘a mere machine in the hands of the court’.55This pattern of court inquiry 
and authorisation reveal the minute and detailed nature of judicial protection as well as 
its essential rigour. 
Since the principle which guided the court in its control of the lunatic’s property 
was that if he recovered, he would find his estate exactly as it was before he became 
insane, the court was very conservative and careful in what it would and would not 
allow. Unless it was a matter of urgency and necessity, it would not permit a substantial 
change in the estate, would not allow more for repairs than the tenant for life would 
reasonably be expected to lay out, and would never in practice allow real property to be 
converted into personalty, or vice versa; indeed, care was taken to ensure that the 
property of the lunatic retained its character as realty or personalty.56 Furthermore, the 
courts construed the powers of the committee of the estate restrictively. For example, the 
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act directed that in all its provisions the committee should 
stand in the place of the lunatic and then gave the committee the power to sell the 
corpus of the property. The court, however, decided that the committee could not act at 
all under these clauses without first seeking the authorisation of the court.57  
The complete deprivation of personal control over the management of property 
resulting from the status of Chancery lunatic meant that those individuals who were 
placed under the care and protection of the Lord Chancellor were generally those who 
were believed by their physicians to have no hope of recovery following some two or 
three years in a lunatic state, since only at that point would long term arrangements for 
the management of the patient’s property become necessary. 58 Only if there were very 
pressing matters, such as bills to be paid which could not be met by family or friends, 
would an inquisition be applied for immediately, but this was exceptional.59  
                                                 
53 LMA  ACC/1156/041. 
54 LMA  ACC/1156/56. 
55 Arthur J. Johnes, Suggestions for a Reform of the Court of Chancery, (Saunders & Benning, London, 
1834) p. 130. 
56 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 qq. 1160, 1241-43.  
57 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 qq. 1165-66. 
58 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 qq. 1113-14.  See too the medical affidavits in the case of John 
Mitchison, lunatic, of Sunbury in Middlesex: LMA  ACC/1156/071. 
59 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, q. 9432 per Charles Phillips, Commissioner in Lunacy. 
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INACCESSIBILITY OF THE PROCESS 
 
The entire inquisition process, and the highly effective supervision of the lunatic’s estate 
thereafter, was inaccessible to the great majority of the mentally ill, from every 
perspective. First, the law itself was so complex and bulky,60 so technical and so 
dominated by internal practices of the lunacy court  that only practitioners specialising 
in the field understood it. Solicitors with a general practice and members of the public, 
even those with a special interest in the subject, were frequently baffled by the obscurity 
of the legal regime and found it difficult to work out the powers and jurisdiction of the 
various authorities involved in the regulation and management of the insane.61 For 
example, when the Secretary of the Lunacy Law Amendment Society was questioned by 
the Dillwyn Committee in 1877, it was clear that he had a very imperfect understanding 
of the law or practice of lunacy, particularly in relation to the jurisdiction of the Lord 
Chancellor.62 The lack of reporting of the lunacy judges’ decisions not only intensified 
this inaccessibility but also undermined any uniformity of decisions and practice.63  
Secondly, and more significantly, the procedures were extremely costly.  In the 
first years of the nineteenth century the cost of a commission in lunacy was enormous. 
The expense was excessive because the officers appointed by the court to ascertain the 
lunacy were paid by fees rather than salaries. In the country they were paid £20 a day, 
while in London they received double that.64 It was common to use three officers, and as 
the inquiry as to lunacy often lasted a number of days or even weeks, the cost in fees 
alone was generally in the hundreds of pounds.65 Furthermore, each member of the jury 
received a guinea a day, and as the solicitors were paid according to the time the 
commission took, it was in their interests to prolong the proceedings as much as they 
could. And finally, a flagrant but common abuse adding to the costs was the practice of 
all the parties involved meeting to dine at the end of every day, at the expense of the 
lunatic.66  
When the proceedings were transferred to the masters in Chancery after the 
verdict as to lunacy, then petitions, orders and reports were necessary whenever 
anything needed to be done with the property, with supporting affidavit evidence and 
                                                 
60 By 1868 there were over forty Acts relating to the insane. 
61 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1877) (373) xiii 1, q. 10973  per Francis Barlow, Senior Master in Lunacy. 
62 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1877) (373) xiii 1, qq. 6923-7019  per James Billington, Secretary of the Lunacy 
Law Amendment Society. The distinction between the Lunacy Commissioners and the Chancery 
Visitors was unclear to the public: Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy 
Law, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1877) (373) xiii 1, q. 7548 per Dr George Blandford, 
physician. 
63 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 29985 per Thomas 
Fischer, Master in Lunacy.  
64 The Times 31 March 1852. 
65 The Times 31 March 1852. 
66 The Times 31 March 1852. 
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the joining of all the next of kin represented by their own solicitors at every stage, and 
even the poorest and simplest cases. The system was lengthy, cumbrous and expensive 
in every case of inquisition, partly as a result of the court fees, but primarily because of 
the professional charges of solicitors and counsel, which proved the greatest burden on 
middle class lunatics. Professional fees for the preparation of the extensive 
documentation of every step of each property transaction were very high, the cost being 
quadrupled at least by the status of one of parties as a lunatic.67 Any estate including 
land would necessarily be more expensive to manage. The appointment of agents to 
collect rents, repairs, the cutting of timber, replanting, draining, fencing, ensuring water 
supplies and so on were all questions which had to be addressed and would require 
directions from the master and the formal permission of the court.68 To obtain these, 
professional assistance was required.  Where litigation was necessary the costs would 
rise astronomically. One instance was the case of the fifth Earl of Sefton, who was found 
lunatic by inquisition after a steeplechasing fall in which he suffered severe brain 
damage.69 Litigation was needed to establish whether the court had jurisdiction to order 
the alienation of part of the earl’s estate in view of the prohibition contained in the 
statute De Prerogativa Regis.70 The considerable expenses involved in every aspect of 
bringing a lunatic’s property under the control of the Lord Chancellor in lunacy was 
borne by the estate of the lunatic.   
So expensive was the inquisition process and the protection it entailed, that it 
was in practice used primarily by wealthy individuals who had the means to pay for it 
and a sufficiently large fortune to warrant it. Chancery lunatics, therefore, formed a 
small proportion of the lunatic population. In 1876 there were 57,407 pauper lunatics 
and nearly 8,000 private patients. Of these about 1000 were Chancery lunatics under the 
direct supervision of the Lord Chancellor.71 The exact value of the property possessed by 
lunatics was not known, but the official returns showed that in 1847 the aggregate yearly 
income of the 542 patients found insane by inquisition amounted to £280,000, most of 
which was used for their benefit or that of their families.72 The Earl of Sefton was a 
typical Chancery lunatic, having extensive estates in the north of England, including the 
two estates forming the subject of the litigation in 1898 which were themselves valued at 
some £800,000 each and together bringing in net rentals of over £50,000 a year. The 
administration of his estate in lunacy lasted only four years until his premature death. 
Another typical Chancery lunatic was John Mitchison, the son of a silk merchant who 
was found lunatic by inquisition in 1864.73 His estate, worth some £85,000 and including 
a number of houses in London as well as stock, was administered by the court for some 
                                                 
67 See for example the volume of papers associated with the sale of two houses belonging to a 
Chancery lunatic in 1880: LMA  ACC/1156/56.  
68 See for example the court’s supervision of the sale of a lunatic’s property which was in a 
dangerous state of repair: LMA  ACC/1156/56. 
69 The National Archives [hereafter TNA] C 211/63/31. 
70 Re Earl of Sefton [1898] 2 Ch 378. 
71 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1877) (373) xiii 1, qq. 75-78 per Charles Perceval, Secretary to the Lunacy 
Commissioners. 
72 Further Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1847-8) (858) xxxii 371 at 435-7. 
73 LMA  ACC/1156/071. 
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35 years until his death in 1899.74  The evidence shows that it was not only the wealthy 
who used the inquisition process. The middle classes used it to some extent, and indeed 
one court official observed that ‘[t]he Chancery lunatics are not a rich class’.75 Of the 514 
Chancery lunatics in the return to Parliament of 28 February 1853, 216 had incomes of 
less than £200 a year, nearly 200 had incomes ranging from £200 to £1000 pa, and some 
65 had incomes of over £1,000 pa.76 In 1859, out of 600 estates in the lunacy court , there 
were 140 where the incomes were less than £100, and another 140 where it was between 
£100 and £200.77  However, such patients used the inquisition process for want of any 
alternative legal protection, and it was often at the expense of their entire small fortunes. 
The great majority did not seek the protection of the judicial authority in lunacy, even 
when it was necessary.  
 
 
PROCEDURAL REFORMS  
 
The practical denial of the judicial protective regime to the mentally ill possessing small 
estates was vigorously criticised. Demands for reform were predicated on the principle 
that where any lunatic owned property, large or small, it was the duty of the Lord 
Chancellor to take possession of it for the benefit of the patient. Inevitably, therefore, 
calls for reforms focussed on the deficiencies in the inquisition system within the judicial 
process. It was clear that the principal complaint was the excessive delay and cost of the 
inquisition proceeding. One commentator observed in 1834 that ‘there is no abuse of the 
Court of Chancery more glaring than the enormous expenses by which it…wastes the 
estates of insane persons’.78 
The urgent and evident need to make the inquisition process cheaper and 
simpler resulted in a programme of piecemeal reforming legislation over the following 
fifty years. In 1833 it was enacted that the commission in lunacy could be addressed to 
any one officer appointed by the court rather than the usual three, 79 and a statute of 
1842 effected a major improvement when it empowered the Lord Chancellor to replace 
these ad hoc appointees with two permanent salaried officers, later known as masters in 
lunacy.80 They would be responsible for conducting all the inquiries relating to the 
lunacy and the property and would take full and informed control of the lunatic’s estate.  
                                                 
74 LMA  ACC/1156/076. 
75 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, q. 879 per Dr Lockhart Robertson, Chancery Visitor. 
76 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1852-3) (323) lxxviii 331.  
77 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 1190.  
78 Arthur J. Johnes, Suggestions for a Reform of the Court of Chancery (Saunders & Benning, London 
1834) p.130. 
79 Commissioners of Lunacy Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will IV c.36) s. 1. See too The Times 31 March 1852. 
80 Lunacy Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 84) s. 1. They were originally called Commissioners in Lunacy, 
but were renamed Masters in Lunacy by 8 & 9 Vict c. 100 s. 2 (1845), to avoid confusion with the 
new bureaucratic body, the Lunacy Commissioners. 
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  The most significant and effective procedural reforms were introduced by Lord 
St Leonards,81 who, along with Lord Lyndhurst, was one of the most active and 
visionary reformers of the lunacy laws and a Lord Chancellor who took his lunacy 
jurisdiction very seriously.  He aimed to reduce the formalities, delays and thereby the 
‘vast expense’, not least in professional costs,82 necessary in the inquisition process. 83 He 
did so through four specific reforms in the Lunacy Regulation Act 1853.84 It was 
introduced by. First, the Act introduced a general commission authorising the masters to 
proceed in every case of alleged lunacy, instead of the separate commissions necessary 
before the Act.85 Secondly, it empowered the master to conduct the inquisition without 
summoning a jury.86 The master would decide whether the alleged lunatic was of 
unsound mind or not, and his certificate would have the same authority as the finding of 
a jury.87 Thirdly, and also with the object of reducing all unnecessary expense, it 
authorised the masters to inquire and report in respect of the managing, repairing or 
letting of the patient’s estate without the need for an order of reference.88 The authority 
of the Lord Chancellor was carefully preserved though, because the parties were 
empowered to appeal against any order made by the master. Finally, the Act made 
important reforms to the fees system, and in so doing unequivocally favoured small 
estates. It provided that the expense of administering the estates of lunatics under the 
authority of the Lord Chancellor should be defrayed partly by fees and partly by means 
of a percentage levied on the lunatic’s net annual income. This percentage was 
‘graduated in an equitable manner as between the richer and poorer estates.’89 Incomes 
under £1000 paid a maximum of £40 in any one year, and incomes under £100 a year 
paid nothing90 and thus received the services of the court free, a concession to the poorer 
lunatic that came to be regarded as unfair to other lunatics and the state, though was 
justified on the grounds of charity.91  The Act also abolished the old fees and replaced 
them with a fee of £2 for each order of the Lord Chancellor, and £1 for each report or 
                                                 
81See too ‘Lord Derby’s Policy as  to Law Reform’, 16 Law Review and Quarterly Journal of British 
and Foreign Jurisprudence 1-32 at 11 (1852). 
82 See Parliamentary Debates, ser. 3, vol. 126, 3 May 1853 (HL) cols. 1025-27. 
83 See generally T.C.S Keely, ‘One Hundred Years of Lunacy Administration’ 8 Cambridge Law 
Journal 195-200 (1942-44). 
84 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70). See generally ‘Lunacy’, 16 Law Review & Quarterly 
Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 190-201 (1852). 
85 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s. 39. 
86 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s. 42. A jury would be summoned if the alleged 
lunatic requested one or the court thought it desirable: ibid. ss. 41;43. 
87 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s. 44. Inquisitions became increasingly rare in the 
early twentieth century: Between 1914 and 1923 there were in all only 11 inquisitions, none of 
which was held with a jury: Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 415. 
88 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s. 69.  
89 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s. 26. 
90 See an example of a refund of the lunacy percentage charged by mistake on a small income: 
TNA  T1/11283. 
91 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 29483; 29488-89 per 
William Ambrose, Master in Lunacy; q. 30117 per Thomas Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
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certificate of the masters.92 But where a lunatic’s property was less than £700 in capital 
value, or where his income was £50 pa or less, the Lord Chancellor had the discretion to 
exempt the estate from both the fees and the percentage.93  
The wider reforms in legal process that characterised the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, culminating in the Judicature Acts 1873-5, ‘left Lunacy in a 
backwater, outside the stream of progress’,94 but the efforts of Lord Selborne and Lord 
Halsbury, following a recommendation by Sir George Jessel in 1883 that lunacy practice 
be assimilated to the new improved Chancery practice, eventually bore fruit and the law 
of lunacy was remodelled in modern form in the Lunacy Act 1890.95 Procedurally, a 
major improvement was effected when in 1891 the masters were made judges of first 
instance in lunacy with power to make orders themselves, obviating the costly need for 
multiple reports to the Lord Chancellor, and indeed enabling them to do in their own 
right what the lunacy court invariably did on their recommendation, a reform that in 
fact would simply mirror the practice in the Court of Chancery itself. Reformers had 
been calling for this for years,96 but it was only effected when it was realised that the 
work given to the masters under the Lunacy Act 1890 was so extensive that it could not 
be done by the judges in lunacy alone. The amending Act passed fifteen months later 
allowed the work of the judge in lunacy under the Act ‘as to administration and 
management’97 to be undertaken by the masters in lunacy.98 The latter were, in effect, 
made judges.99  
The reforms to the inquisition procedures were directed towards all Chancery 
lunatics, and not towards small estates in particular, but they undoubtedly helped the 
latter to bear the costs of an inquisition and thereby permitted greater access to judicial 
protection. They were welcomed as a significant improvement in the law for the 
regulation of the property of lunatics100 and were said to have ‘given satisfaction to all 
                                                 
92 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s. 29. In 1859 some £8000 a year in lunatics’ fees was 
being paid into the General Suitors Fund of the court. 
93 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) s. 32. 
94 H. S. Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (London, Stevens & Sons, 1924) p. 77. 
95 H. S. Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (London, Stevens & Sons, 1924) pp. 80-81. 
96 The reforms of 1853 stopped short of giving the Master the authority to make an order himself. 
Had that been effected, the costs of the inquisition procedure would have been reduced 
considerably, but the view was taken that the Masters should be kept under the court’s control in 
order to ensure that they remained ‘active and diligent in the discharge of their duties’: Minutes 
of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
(1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 1316 per Charles Wilde, Registrar in Lunacy. See too See Minutes of 
Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
1877 (373) xiii 1,  qq. 11154-55  per Joseph Elmer, Report Clerk of Masters in Lunacy;  Minutes of 
Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1859, 
session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 1190. 
97 Interpreted to mean the administration and management of property. 
98 Lunacy Act Amendment Act 1891(54 & 55 Vict. c .65) s. 27(1). 
99 The Masters’ orders took effect unless annulled or varied by the judges. A number of orders 
could only be made by the judges in lunacy, namely those for the inquisition and supersedeas, as 
well as vesting orders and orders requiring Chancery jurisdiction under the Lands Clauses 
Consolidation Acts, Settled Estates Act 1877 and Settled Land Acts 1882-90. 
100 Parliamentary Debates, ser. 3, vol. 126, 6 May 1853 (HL) col. 1221 per the Earl of Shaftesbury.  
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persons in the profession.’101 By reducing the formalities at every step of the process the 
costs were lessened considerably.  The number of petitions, orders and reports required 
were halved, and since the whole process was more expeditious the fees of the sheriff, 
jury, counsel, solicitors and witnesses were all significantly lower than before. In the ten 
years following the introduction of the reformed system in 1842, the length of the 
commissions - and therefore their cost – was reduced from weeks to days. Between 40 
and 50 commissions took place each year, and of these only 19 took more than a day, 
and only five took more than two days,102 and it was thought that the expense of an 
inquisition had been reduced by one third. By 1859 only three of the 70 cases a year at 
that time were held before a jury.103 In the early 1860s the expense of the inquisition 
itself, the appointment of the committee and the fixing of maintenance in the case of a 
small estate of £1,400 amounted to £216, of which £55 were court fees, and again for a 
small estate of  £800, the cost was £183 of which £58 were court fees.104 In the case of the 
smallest estates the expenses were reduced to about £75, including the court fees, and 
sometimes as low as £40.105  Although a contested inquisition could still cost some 
£10,000 at the end of the century due to the expenses of counsel and expert witnesses,106 
an uncontested case could cost as little as £15.107 Although these costs were undeniably 
less than at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were still material and for very 
small estates amounted to ‘a grievous hardship’.108 What was lacking was any 
substantive reform to the lunacy law providing a specific regime directed to protect 
small estates.  
 
 
SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS FOR SMALL ESTATES  
 
The Lord Chancellor in Chancery had no jurisdiction over lunatics not so found by 
inquisition and so could do nothing to assist lunatics of small estate who could not 
afford the costs of the process. However desirable it was that he should possess such 
jurisdiction, it could only be conferred by the legislature, and any attempt to do so 
                                                 
101The Times 31 March 1852  
102 ‘Lunacy’, 16 Law Review & Quarterly Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 190-201 at 192 
(1852). 
103 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 946 per Charles Wilde, Registrar in Lunacy.  
104 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 1310 per Charles Wilde, Registrar in Lunacy. 
105 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 qq. 1310-13 per Charles Wilde, Registrar in Lunacy. 
106 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 292924 per W. 
H. Winterbotham, Official Solicitor.  
107 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 29292-98 per 
W. H. Winterbotham, Official Solicitor; see too Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal 
Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 3003 per T. H. Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
108 ‘Lunacy’, 16 Law Review & Quarterly Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 190-201 at 197 
(1852)  
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without such authority was regarded as ‘an irregularity’.109 The judicial consensus was 
that he could only intervene to order the maintenance of a person of unsound mind in 
the context of the administration of a trust.110  
The legislature, however, did not respond with any substantive reforms for the 
benefit of small estates until more than a decade later, and then in a very limited way. 
Although the primary duty of the bureaucratic organ, the Lunacy Commissioners, was 
to ensure the care of the persons of lunatics in approved institutions, in 1845 they were 
given the authority to take action if they had reason to believe that the property of a 
person detained as a lunatic was not being properly protected, or the income arising 
from it was not being used for the patient’s maintenance.111 They would learn of such 
abuse through information from family or friends, or from the lunatic himself in the 
course of the Commissioners’ official visits. The Commissioners could, in such 
circumstances, make inquiries and report the abuse to the Lord Chancellor. Although 
the power could be useful in relation to Chancery lunatics provided with an insufficient 
allowance,112 given the primary role of the Commissioners in regulating pauper lunatics, 
this provision was implicitly directed towards the protection of the property of poor and 
middle class lunatics. Where any certified lunatic had been the subject of a report, or had 
been detained for the past twelve months, the Lord Chancellor could direct one of the 
masters to examine the lunatic in question, and if he was satisfied as to his lunacy the 
Lord Chancellor could appoint a receiver of the estate.113 This receiver was to have the 
same powers as the receiver of the estate of a lunatic so found. Receivers were often 
appointed in inquisition cases in addition to a committee of the estate, for example if the 
committee did not have the time or expertise to manage the property or where no 
person was willing to act as committee.114 The Act also empowered the Lord Chancellor 
to make orders for the application of the lunatic’s income for his maintenance and made 
provision for the investment of surplus ‘for the use of such Lunatic as to the Lord 
Chancellor should from Time to Time in each Case seem fit’.115 The jurisdiction of the 
Lord Chancellor over the property of these quasi-Chancery lunatics lasted only as long 
as the lunatic was confined under certification, and then for the maximum of six months 
at the court’s discretion. The receivership provision was amended in 1852 to address 
                                                 
109 Re Ridgway (1828) 5 Russ 152 at 153 per Lord Lyndhurst LC; See too Bishop of Exeter v. Ward 
(1833) 2 Myl & K 54; H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1877) p. 210.   
110 Re Bligh (1879) 12 Ch 364 at 365 per James and Cotton LJJ. See too Vane v. Vane (1876) 2 Ch. D 
124. 
111 An Act for the Regulation of the Care and Treatment of Lunatics 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 100) s. 94. 
112 See Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1860) (495) xxii 349 at qq. 415-6 per Lord Shaftesbury. But note that despite 
the statutory provision, in practice the Lunacy Commissioners were unable independently to get 
any information about the property of a Chancery lunatic, and had to rely on the Masters for that 
information: Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 qq. 1086-88. 
113 An Act for the Regulation of the Care and Treatment of Lunatics 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c.100) s. 95. 
Note that he was also empowered to appoint a guardian of the person, corresponding to the 
committee of the person where a lunatic was so found by inquisition. 
114 Charles Phillips, The Law Concerning Idiots, Lunatics and Persons of Unsound Mind (London: 
James Wildy, 1858)  p. 284. 
115 An Act for the Regulation of the Care and Treatment of Lunatics 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 100) s. 95.  
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doubts which had arisen as to whether the Act authorised the receipt of dividends on 
government or bank stock or annuities standing in the lunatic’s name, confirming that 
the receiver had this power, and giving full indemnity to the Bank of England and other 
companies for acts done.116 Furthermore, the receiver was given the power to make 
repairs and improvements to the lunatic’s land.117 In 1853 the master’s inquiry as to 
lunacy following a report authorised by the 1845 Act was discontinued on the basis that 
proceedings under a commission ensured much greater protection of property and that 
the 1853 legislation would ensure that process was cheaper.118 The Lunacy 
Commissioners’ report was to have the effect of an ordinary petition for an inquisition 
supported by evidence.119   
Sometimes the Lunacy Commissioners felt that the exercise of these powers was 
unnecessary, and they took instead an undertaking from the lunatic’s next of kin that 
they would supply the patient with ‘all the comforts and luxuries he is capable of 
appreciating’120  but they used their reporting powers in a large number of cases. Not 
only did this affirm that they perceived their duty as one to ensure that the income of 
certified lunatics was properly applied for the patients’ benefit,121 it suggested that they 
had found a significant number of instances of abuse of lunatics’ property.122 In 1846 
they reported that they had ‘repeatedly made inquiries’123 and by 1847 reports were 
regularly being made, many of which led directly to proceedings before the masters in 
lunacy to ensure effective protection.124 For example, the brother of a patient in a county 
lunatic asylum wrote to the Lunacy Commissioners telling them that his brother had a 
little property and that there was no one to look after it. As it was clear that the patient 
was unlikely to recover soon, the Commissioners reported the case to the Lord 
Chancellor, a step which amounted to an application for an inquisition. The Lord 
Chancellor sent his own officer to see the patient, and when he confirmed the insanity an 
inquisition was ordered. Despite strong medical evidence that he was insane, the jury 
found he was not, but he had to pay the costs amounting to some £600 himself.125  
                                                 
116 Property of Lunatics Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 48) ss. 4, 5. 
117 Property of Lunatics Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 48) s. 6.  
118 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c.70) ss. 52, 53. See Danby P. Fry Lunacy Law (Knight & 
Co., London 1890) pp. 18-19. 
119 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 c. 70) s. 54. 
120 Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1870) House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1870) (340) xxxiv 1 at 65.  
121 See a letter from the Lunacy Commissioners to the brother of a certified lunatic: TNA  
MH/51/64.  
122 Further Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1847 
(858) xxxii 371 at 406-7. 
123 Report of the Lunacy Commissioners to the Lord Chancellor, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1846) (471) xxxiii 339 at 340. See for example the case of Mrs Lowe in Hanwell Asylum: 
Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, q. 4423 per John White, solicitor.  
124 Under the Act for the Regulation of the Care and Treatment of Lunatics 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 
100) s. 95. See the official return to Parliament in 1862, confirming the use of the provision by 
patients with modest incomes: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1862) (509) xliv 547. 
125 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, qq. 9384-9409 per Charles Phillips, Commissioner in Lunacy. 
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Although the power of the Lunacy Commissioners did not catch all cases of abuse of 
property, it was sufficiently effective for it to be maintained in all the lunacy legislation 
including the major consolidating Act of 1890,126 under which the matter raised by the 
Lunacy Commissioners would be referred by the Lord Chancellor to the Official 
Solicitor, instructing him either to appoint himself as receiver or to make further 
inquiries.127 However cases dwindled to often no more than one a year128 when 
alternative simpler, faster and cheaper processes became available. Indeed, 
communication between the masters and the Lunacy Commissioners was, by 1906, ‘very 
rare’.129  
The reporting provisions were only impliedly for middle class and poorer 
lunatics, in that they were aimed at lunatics who had been detained under certificates 
and reception orders. While the process ensured, as never before, that abuses of such 
lunatics’ property were brought to official cognisance, and the proceedings were 
undoubtedly cheaper than by the traditional full inquisition because there was no need 
to pay for the issue of the commission, that cost was only a small proportion of the 
whole, and beyond that the patient simply entered the existing judicial process of 
inquisition, which was left as expensive, slow and formal as before. It was, 
consequently, of limited assistance to poorer lunatics and as such was subject to 
widespread criticism. Only two years after this new provision was first enacted, the 
Lunacy Commissioners criticised both its substance and its operation.130 They said that 
‘where the funds are small, and the parties in humble circumstances’ the protective 
regime was practically unavailable.131 They gave as an example a person ‘in the lower 
walks of life’ who became insane after having, ‘by industry and economy,’ saved a small 
sum and invested it in government stock in his own name. The sum might yield 
sufficient income, perhaps £20 a year, with which his wife and family could support him 
either in a private asylum or at home, depending on the nature and extent of his 
insanity. However the dividends could not be made available for the support of the 
lunatic or his family132 because it was doubtful whether the Lord Chancellor had the 
power to compel a transfer of stock by the Bank of England. Furthermore, it seemed that 
the 1845 Act enabled the Lord Chancellor to deal only with the income of the lunatic’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
See too Seventeenth Report of the Lunacy Commissioners, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
(1863) (331) xx 437. 
126 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) s.100. See too ibid s. 50. 
127 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 29121-24; 
29198 per W.H. Winterbotham, Official Solicitor. 
128 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble 
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 30274-75 per Thomas 
Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
129 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble 
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 30277 per Thomas 
Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
130 Further Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1847 
(858) xxxii 371 at 406.   
131 Further Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy,  House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1847 
(858) xxxii 371 at 406. 
132 Further Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy,  House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1847 
(858) xxxii 371 at 406. 
PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LUNACY LAW  
Page 19 of 37 
N:\Repositories\Open Access\All REF Pilot Publications\Law\STEBBINGS\Stebbings_PROTECTING 
THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL.doc 
25/02/2013 
estate, and not the corpus. The Lunacy Commissioners suggested that it would have 
been useful had the power to receive dividends been given by statute to the master in 
lunacy, or some other officer, for the benefit of the lunatic and his family.133 In the three 
years following the passing of the 1845 Act, the Lunacy Commissioners reported on 
some thirty cases of suspected abuse of lunatics’ property. In two cases the Lord 
Chancellor’s powers were found to be insufficient, and commissions were later issued, 
with the considerable expense that entailed. 134 
The inadequacy of the law’s provision for the protection of smaller estates of 
lunatics detained under reception orders was also forcibly criticised by the Law 
Amendment Society135 which called for three specific reforms: to empower the Lord 
Chancellor to apply the corpus of the lunatic’s property to the payment of costs or other 
suitable purpose; to resolve the difficulties existing in compelling the Bank of England to 
transfer stock or pay dividends; and to extend and clarify the powers of the receiver, 
notably with respect to the lunatic’s real estate. The Society proposed that these 
improvements could be achieved by vesting all the property of the lunatic in an official 
committee, ‘to be administered for his benefit by the masters in lunacy, or by some local 
jurisdiction in the provinces.’136 This would protect the property from well-meaning 
mismanagement, waste, fraud and theft. It would ensure that allowances would be 
made to maintain both the lunatic and any dependants, that the patient’s lands and 
buildings would be properly managed, repairs effected, debts collected and money 
securely invested, all for the benefit of the lunatic and his heirs.  This, argued the 
Society, was not a reform but, rather, a restitution of the law as they were merely calling 
for the revival of the principle embodied in the statute De Prerogativa Regis.137 The scope 
of the statute had become limited by the expense of the inquisition process,  but the 
correct position in legal theory was that where any lunatic had any property, large or 
small, the Crown – represented by the Lord Chancellor - would take possession of it for 
the lunatic’s benefit.  
The next reforming provision for the protection of small estates, however, 
adopted a more orthodox approach and yet one which was both novel and subsequently 
to prove of immense significance because it provided for a summary process expressly 
for dealing with small estates. The  Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 provided that where the 
net amount of a lunatic’s property was less than £500, and it appeared to the Lord 
Chancellor to be expedient in view of the lunatic’s circumstances and situation that the 
property should be made available for maintenance, he had the power to order that it be 
sold and the proceeds transferred to a relative of the lunatic or some other proper person 
                                                 
133 Further Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy,  House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1847 
(858) xxxii 371 at 407. 
134 ‘Reports of the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law’, 9 Law Review & Quarterly 
Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 313-336  (1848-49) at 320-1n.  
135 9 Law Review & Quarterly Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 313-336 (1848-49). See too 
Committee of the Alleged Lunatics’ Friends’ Society, The Laws of Lunacy and their Crimes, as they 
Affect all Classes of Society, (London, Charles and Tiver, 1859); Nicholas Hervey ‘Advocacy or 
Folly: the Alleged Lunatics’ Friend Society, 1845-63’ 30 Medical History 245-75 (1986). 
136 ‘Reports of the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law’, 9 Law Review & Quarterly 
Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 313-336  (1848-49) at 321. 
137 ‘Reports of the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law’, 9 Law Review & Quarterly 
Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 313-336  (1848-49) at 321.   
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for that purpose, rather than appointing a committee for the continuing management of 
the estate.138 The object was to make the property available for the lunatic’s maintenance 
in a simpler, cheaper and more direct way. This reform was of limited assistance in that 
it applied only to lunatics so found, it remained prohibitively expensive and excessively 
formal for those lunatics with small principal sums or annuities, or small interests in 
land.  
It was, however, a reform of lasting and essential importance in that it was 
subsequently developed and extended in 1862 to form what was the first step in 
protecting the small estates of lunatics not so found by inquisition. The object was to 
apply the property for the benefit of the lunatic ‘in a summary and inexpensive 
Manner’,139 and to that end it provided that where a person was established as a lunatic, 
whether under the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor or the regulation of the Lunacy 
Commissioners, and his property did not exceed £1000 in value or yielded an income of 
up to £50 a year,140 the Lord Chancellor could make an order to make the property 
available for the lunatic’s benefit or maintenance. Significantly, no inquiry under a 
commission of lunacy would be required.141 And in order to give effect to this, it 
empowered the Lord Chancellor to sell or mortgage the land or any other property of 
the lunatic for his benefit. The proceeds were to be paid to a relative or other proper 
person under the direction of the Lord Chancellor to receive and apply the money.142 
This reform was of immense significance for small estates, partly because it 
unequivocally addressed property of that nature and provided a summary process for 
ensuring its judicial protection outside the inquisition process, but also because it 
separated the custody of the person from the protection of property. The lunatic would 
remain in his asylum under the original reception order and certificates and thereby 
under the supervision of the Lunacy Commissioners, while the Lord Chancellor would 
make a summary order providing for his proper maintenance. As the Lord Chancellor 
had the same powers as if the lunatic had been so found by inquisition, the Act in effect 
created a quasi-Chancery lunatic under a special jurisdiction to provide for 
maintenance,143 with no judicial control over the lunatic’s person. As a special 
jurisdiction as to maintenance with a summary process ensuring the protection of 
property alone by the judicial authority,144 this reform was subsequently recognised as ‘a 
step in the right direction’145 and ‘tentative’ reform.146 Although there were some doubts 
                                                 
138 Lunacy Regulation Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 70) s.120.  
139 Lunacy Regulation Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 86) s.12.  
140 The limit was raised in 1882 to £2000 capital or £100 a year in income: Lunacy Regulation 
Amendment Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 82) s. 3. 
141 Harvey v. Trenchard (1864) 34 Beav 240; H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of 
Lunacy (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1877) p. 215; A. Wood Renton, The Law of and Practice in 
Lunacy, (W.M.Green & Sons, Edinburgh; Stevens & Haynes, London: 1897) pp. 394-7. 
142 Lunacy Regulation Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 86) s. 13.  
143 The Act also extended the powers of charging the lunatic’s property to pay for his 
maintenance, debts and costs:  Lunacy Regulation Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 86) s. 16.  
144 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, qq. 10704-21 at 10721, per Charles Wilde, Registrar in 
Lunacy; TNA MH 51/54. For the procedures, see H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice 
of Lunacy (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1877) pp. 212-3; 471-2.  
145 H. S. Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (London, Stevens & Sons, 1924) p. 76. 
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as to the effectiveness of the court’s control of the receiver,147 the provision was widely 
used and as such was hugely beneficial to small estates in simple cases.148  
Despite these reforms, spanning some fifty years, a commentator complained in 
1880 that the law had still been unable or unwilling to construct a cheap and quick 
method of ensuring that the property of lunatics came under the protection of the Lord 
Chancellor.149 Certainly the Lunacy Commissioners themselves believed that there still 
remained a large number of insane persons ‘whose little savings have no protection 
whatever under the Lunacy law’ because they did not reach the minimum amounts 
required for protection under the Act of 1862.150 There were still complaints as to the 
technicality, delay and expense of the inquisition process in the late nineteenth 
century,151 but in 1889 introduced some long needed and important amendments to the 
law were introduced,152 principally concerning the precautions relating to the 
establishment of lunacy by requiring the authority of a judge, magistrate or justice of the 
peace for the reception of lunatics into asylums,153 but also making new provision with 
respect to property. First, it provided that in the case of lunatics so found by inquisition, 
an order could be made for the commitment of the estate alone, and not of the person, if 
it were found that although the lunatic was of unsound mind and could not manage his 
affairs, he could manage himself and was not a danger to himself or anyone else.154 
Secondly, it permitted the judge to make an order relating to the property of any lunatic 
not so found by inquisition, and to that of a person incapable of managing his affairs 
through mental infirmity resulting from disease or age.155 Any person approved by the 
judge could exercise the same powers as the committee of the estate would in the case of 
a lunatic so found by inquisition. And thirdly, it authorised the County Court judge to 
make orders as to the property of a lunatic under £200 in value.156  This last provision, 
unequivocally directed towards increasing the protection of small estates, addressed the 
situation where the lunatic had no friend or relative willing to manage his property and 
was entirely new. The judge could sell the lunatic’s real or personal property and would 
direct how the money should be applied for the lunatic’s benefit, or indeed in 
                                                                                                                                                 
146 Earl of Halsbury, The Laws of England, 3rd edn. (Butterworth & Co., London, 1960) vol. 29 p. 
565. 
147 H. S. Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (London, Stevens & Sons, 1924) p. 76. 
148 H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1877) p. 
215. 
149 C. Lockhart Robertson, Lunacy in England: England’s Irren-Wesen, (LSE Selected Pamphlets: 
1880) p. 17. 
150 Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1870) House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1870) (340) xxxiv 1 at 63. 
151 T. Raleigh, ‘The Lunacy Laws’, 1 Law Quarterly Review 150-161 at 155 (1885). 
152 Lunacy Acts Amendment Act (52 & 53 Vict c. 41). 
153 It was over this provision that the Earl of Shaftesbury wished to resign: see Geoffrey B.A.M. 
Finlayson, The Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury (Eyre Methuen, London, 1981) pp. 592-3. 
154 52 & 53 Vict c. 41 s. 48. 
155 52 & 53 Vict c. 41 s. 52. 
156 52 & 53 Vict c. 41 s. 54; Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c.5) s. 132.    
PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LUNACY LAW  
Page 22 of 37 
N:\Repositories\Open Access\All REF Pilot Publications\Law\STEBBINGS\Stebbings_PROTECTING 
THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL.doc 
25/02/2013 
reimbursing the parish for the cost of his care. The court could invest it on behalf of the 
lunatic. It was, however, very rarely exercised. 157  
The law of lunacy was consolidated and amended in 1890, in a major statute that 
was to form the core of the legal regime in lunacy for the next seventy years.158 The 
extensive powers of the Lord Chancellor over lunatics’ property, which had increasingly 
been given statutory expression throughout the nineteenth century and were 
comprehensive, were gathered together to form a substantial portion of the Act159 and 
were made applicable in a summary way to six categories of individual.160  Chancery 
lunatics formed the first and smallest category.161 Despite continued problems of 
expense and technicality regarding the inquisition process, its declining use, and calls 
for its abolition,162 it was retained. It was useful in the case of all large estates and where, 
for example, it was necessary or desirable to appoint a committee of the person, to 
prevent a marriage,163 to limit the right to contract, or where the patient lived or owned 
property abroad.164 The largest category was lunatics under reception orders founded on 
medical certification,165  though the emphasis in that class was on the detention of the 
person rather than the protection of property, and a lack of capacity in relation to 
property was not automatically assumed. Individuals who were neither detained nor 
found lunatic by inquisition, but were unable to manage their property due to mental 
infirmity resulting from disease or old age constituted a new and wide class in which the 
individuals concerned were not regarded as lunatic.166 In this growing category167  it was 
                                                 
157 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 28465-6; 28521  
per Cozens-Hardy LJ.  
158 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5). 
159 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) ss. 116-143.   
160 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) s. 116(1) paras (a)–(f) . 
161 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) s. 116(1) (a). 
162 T. Raleigh, ‘The Lunacy Laws’, 1 Law Quarterly Review 150-161 at 160 (1885). 
163 Marriage of Lunatics Act 1741 (15 Geo II c. 30). A Master in Lunacy observed in 1908 that there 
were cases where it was necessary to have an inquisition ‘to protect the man from the evil-
minded who would plunder him of his property, or from the very few creatures that there are, 
called women, who would marry such a creature for the purpose of getting his property, and 
only for that purpose’: Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and 
Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 
2952 per T.H. Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
164 Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 415; Royal Commission on the Law Relating to 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1956-57) (169) xvi 1 
at 98. 
165 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5)  s. 116(1) (c). 
166 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) s. 116(1) (d). This provision was apparently drafted by Lord 
Selborne, in light of Lord Cardwell’s inability to manage his own affairs and a reluctance to have 
him declared a lunatic: Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and 
Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 
2921 per T.H. Fischer, Master in Lunacy; Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission 
on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) 
(4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 28486-7 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. The Act thereby refined the categories of 
mental illness, recognising that there existed a mental defect outside the traditional ones of 
idiocy, lunacy and unsoundness of mind.  
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only their property that came under the control and protection of the court, through the 
appointment of a receiver, not their person.  
All categories included some mentally ill individuals with small estates, but a 
further category was introduced expressly and solely to provide for patients of very 
limited means,168 based on the summary processes of earlier provisions in the Acts of 
1853 and 1862.Where a person was of unsound mind169 and incapable of managing his 
affairs, and his property did not exceed £2000 in value or a yearly income of £100, his 
estate would be managed by a receiver under the authority of the lunacy court . The 
provision was liberally construed by the courts,170 and it was a very popular form of 
protection that was ‘greatly appreciated by owners of small property’171 because it gave 
robust protection of their small estates without the loss of status inherent in an 
inquisition and the loss of liberty that came with certification.172 The statutory powers 
addressing the management of property could be exercised by any person as the judge 
should direct,173 and such person was to be subject to the jurisdiction of the judge just as 
if he were the committee of the estate of a lunatic so found by inquisition.174  This person 
was popularly called a receiver, but he was in fact a quasi-committee.  The appointment 
of a receiver was of central importance to the protection of small estates. The receiver 
was usually a member of the lunatic’s family acting out of kindness,175 but if no one was 
available to act, then the Official Solicitor could and did take on the receivership. The 
receiver was usually limited to the receipt of income, with capital sums being brought 
into court in the name of the Paymaster and title deeds of property kept by a bank, only 
                                                                                                                                                 
167 It was widely used by the beginning of the twentieth century: Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) 
(4202) xxxix 159 at para. 758 (p. 443).  
168 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) s. 116(1)(e). The other categories were criminal lunatics (s. 
116(1)(f)) and those under pre-1890 procedures (s. 116(1)(b)). Those in categories (c), (d) and (e) 
were far more numerous than under categories (a), (b) and (f). For the numbers within each 
category in 1908, see Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 761 (p. 444). 
169 His unsoundness of mind needed to be proved by affidavit before the Master or the Lunacy 
Commissioners. 
170 The sums were to be regarded as the net value and net income after deducting debts and 
expenses for past maintenance: Re Adams (1864) 9 LT NS 626; Re Faircloth (1879) 13 Ch D 307; H. 
M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy, 2nd edn, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1890) pp. 226-7. 
171 Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 762 (p. 444). See too TNA  
LCO/10/13. 
172 Otherwise no detention was required, the ‘power of the purse’ being deemed sufficient, but if 
it was necessary then it had to be effected by a reception order or inquisition: Minutes of 
Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 qq. 2897, 3089 per T.H. Fischer, 
Master in Lunacy. 
173 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5)  s. 116(2). 
174 Lunacy Act 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5) s. 116 (3); Lunacy Act 1908 (8 Edw VII c. 47) s.1. 
175 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 30122 per 
Thomas Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
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to be interfered with by the order of the master.176 The receiver was told how much to 
use for maintenance of lunatic and support of his family, and thereafter kept as close a 
control over the patient’s property as a committee would in the case of a Chancery 
lunatic. If, for example, an item for the lunatic’s comfort could not be provided out of 
maintenance, the receiver’s authority had to be sought, however trifling the item.177 
The process whereby the mentally ill could acquire this protection for their 
property under the Act was simple and inexpensive, and equally as effective as an 
inquisition but with considerably less formality and expense. A personal application for 
receivership would cost under 4 shillings, although that would rise to as high as £40 if a 
solicitor were employed.178  For very small properties of less than £700 in value or £50 
yearly income the fees of the master’s office were remitted179 and the procedure could be 
undertaken with no professional advice as it consisted simply of a letter to the master 
containing details of the lunatic and his property, and naming the receiver. But where 
even minimal professional assistance was necessary, the expense was recognised as a 
deterrent to the poorer lunatic with a very small capital sum, a small interest in land, or 
tiny pension, perhaps with no relative to manage the property, in seeking the protection 
of the court.180 Overall, however, the new receivership process was so cheap, easy and 
effective that it was widely used. Records of the Lord Chancellor’s department following 
the Lunacy Act 1890 show that a great many lunatics then coming under his charge had 
small incomes. Some were as low as £25 a year, most were in the region of £300 a year, 
and very few were higher than £1000.181 So popular was it, that it was said to have 
‘driven the old inquisitions out of the market’,182 and indeed the number of inquisitions 
diminished sharply. In 1905 there were about forty a year,183 falling to eleven between 
1914 and 1923,184 and when there were only between 200 and 300 Chancery lunatics in 
                                                 
176 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 2997 per T.H. 
Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
177 See for example, the purchase of a second hand fur coat for a patient: TNA  J 92/3. 
178 Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 530-31. In 1908 the average cost of an application was 
between £15 and £80: Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and 
Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 
29295-6 per W. H. Winterbotham, Official Solicitor though the figure would double if counsel had 
to be instructed.   
179 Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 530. 
180 Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 530.  
181 TNA  LCO 10/12; TNA  LCO 10/13. 
182 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 3006 per T.H. 
Fischer, Master in Lunacy.   
183 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4215) xxxv 83 q. 2956 per T.H. 
Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
184 Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 415.  
PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LUNACY LAW  
Page 25 of 37 
N:\Repositories\Open Access\All REF Pilot Publications\Law\STEBBINGS\Stebbings_PROTECTING 
THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL.doc 
25/02/2013 
total in 1922, it was described as ‘moribund.’185 It was thought that the last inquisition 
took place in 1959.186   
The evidence shows that the Victorian legislature responded actively and 
positively, if slowly, to the challenge of protecting the increasing number of lunatics of 
small estate. The first reforms undoubtedly assisted the very wealthy and the more 
affluent middle classes by reducing the expense of the inquisition, but the amending and 
consolidating legislation of 1889 to 1891 made the care and control of the court available 
to all mentally ill patients, whatever the size of their property, and in effect removed the 
distinction between all categories of the mentally ill with respect to the quality of legal 
protection they enjoyed for their property. When the property of the mentally ill was 
given the protection of the law outside the formal inquisition process, and that 
protection was affordable and robust, adequate legal protection for the middle class and 
poorer lunatic population had been achieved. And these reforms enacted for the benefit 
of the mentally ill with small estates were of wider and yet more profound importance. 
It was the resolution of the challenge posed by small estates that resulted in the 
destruction of the association between property ownership and detention of the person, 
an unfortunate relationship that had dominated the lunacy law. The orthodox paradigm 
categorised the mentally ill according to their property ownership. This relationship was 
a product of the social system of the nineteenth century to ensure the special protection 
of the estates of the propertied classes and served to reinforce social attitudes to the 
effect that different classes of the insane required different treatments. For much of the 
nineteenth century it was significantly easier for a pauper187 to be detained as a lunatic 
than a person with property, since a pauper required the agreement of a Justice of the 
Peace on the basis of unsworn evidence and just one medical practitioner, whereas for a 
private patient, sworn evidence and two medical certificates were required. 
Furthermore, in the case of a pauper the certificates constituted a direction to receive the 
patient, whereas in the case of a private patient they constituted a request to do so. 
Chancery lunatics were designated lunatic on the petition of a friend or relative and the 
subsequent inquisition and could be detained on the order of his committee of the 
person. And thereafter Chancery lunatics, private patients and pauper patients were 
dealt with in significantly different ways, due entirely to the extent of the property they 
owned. The status of the lunatic was thus determined through his property ownership 
and not through his medical condition. The Lunacy Act 1890 was a seminal piece of 
legislation in lunacy law in that it took the first step towards breaking the nexus between 
property and detention in the case of the mentally ill, enabling the management of an 
individual’s property to be removed from him without depriving him of his personal 
liberty.188 The Act reflected advancements in medical science as to the nature and 
                                                 
185 H. S. Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (London, Stevens & Sons, 1924) p. 80. 
186 Raymond Jennings, ‘Jurisdiction in Lunacy’ 23 Modern Law Review 421-424 at 422 n. (1960). 
187 Patients not found of unsound mind by inquisition, nor within the reception orders for private 
patients, were dealt with summarily under the pauper process, namely orders not made on 
petition. For the different methods for detaining a person as a lunatic after the Lunacy Act 1890, 
see Daniel Chamier, Lunacy Law, (Effingham Wilson & Co., 1892) pp. 16-27. 
188 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, q. 1166 per Dr Lockhart Robertson, Chancery Visitor 
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degrees of mental illness189 which undermined the law’s traditional categorisation and 
its intimate relationship to property ownership. The protection of all mentally ill 
patients’ property came to be regarded as an issue of care affecting their well-being 
rather than being central to the determination of their status.190  
 
 
THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION 
 
This extensive and effective recasting of the legal regime protecting the property of the 
mentally ill maintained as its essential and central framework the Lord Chancellor’s 
procedures and jurisdiction in the lunacy court. The inquisition process was indeed 
made cheaper and simpler, but remained a court process and was retained despite all its 
continuing problems. The Lunacy Commissioners’ power to report on the suspected 
abuse of property did no more than to provide a simpler and cheaper process whereby 
the judicial authority was alerted as to the abuse.  When the matter subsequently became 
one of receivership, both under that power and in the 1890 Act, that was a process as 
much under the control of the court as the inquisition process was. The judicial solution 
to the challenge of the growth in the number of lunatics of small estate was 
unequivocally adopted and implemented in the lunacy code of the nineteenth century. 
That the judicial solution should be adopted was never seriously questioned, and 
the evidence reveals a clear, continuous and fundamental refusal to conceive of any 
means of protection other than through the judicial authority in the form of the lunacy 
court. It was almost universally accepted that a court of law, and specifically the lunacy 
court, could not be bettered as the organ of protection of property. This view was 
consistently maintained. In 1860 Lord Shaftesbury, chairman of the Lunacy Commission 
since 1845, acknowledged that the lunacy court’s masters were ‘the superintendents of 
property’,191 and in 1877, when the amalgamation of certain aspects of the work of the 
commissioners and the court was proposed, it was never doubted that the best possible 
protection for a lunatic’s property, and the only appropriate one, was the Lord 
Chancellor in his court.192 In 1906 a lunacy master said the court did the best it could 
with small estates and made them go as long possible for the benefit of the patient.193  
And although in 1908 the transfer of the lunacy jurisdiction to the Chancery Division of 
the High Court was proposed, it was not a jurisdictional change with respect to the 
property of the insane, merely an internal reorganisation within the judicial 
                                                 
189 See too Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 402.  
190 For example in Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at  511-13.  
191 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1860) (495) xxii 349 at 415.    
192 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, qq. 9462-65 per Charles Phillips, Commissioner in Lunacy. 
193 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 30278 per 
Thomas Fischer, Master in Lunacy. 
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framework.194 The conviction that jurisdiction over lunatics’ property, large and small, 
should be kept in the hands of the regular courts, which were accustomed to the work 
and could address it efficiently and expeditiously, was unshaken.195 The notion of 
judicial protection through a specialised court of law was dominant, and none other was 
seriously envisaged despite the former’s problems of expense, delay, inaccessibility. It 
was accepted as the proper and most effective mode of protection. Trenchant and 
deserved though the criticism of the lunacy court’s processes was, the consensus was 
that the principal deficiencies in the process had been addressed and that substance of 
the protection afforded once the process was complete was excellent and provided the 
best protection possible. It was said that its protection of lunatics would ‘always 
redound to its honour’,196 and contemporary commentators referred to its ‘its pitying 
paternal jurisdiction’197 and the ‘excellent keeping’ it afforded the affairs of lunatics.198  
The retention and reinforcement of the lunacy court as the only organ for the 
protection of the property of the mentally ill is a striking feature in the legal history of 
insanity, because the court was one whose very existence was in danger. The threat lay 
in the hostile political climate in which it operated during the crucial formative years of 
the legal regime from 1845 to 1890. This hostility arose from the potency of two 
ideological movements which dominated nineteenth century law-making: state 
intervention and the rationalisation of the legal system.  
It has been seen199 that the orthodox response of the Victorian state to major 
social issues was to impose powerful central government control by establishing a new 
statutory bureaucratic body to implement a programme of reforming regulatory 
legislation, and that this model had been adopted in numerous fields of social concern, 
including lunacy. In most cases, the jurisdiction of the regular courts was to some degree 
undermined and elements of it redirected to the bureaucratic organ with its simple, 
cheap and accessible procedures dealing with small cases, whether they were 
adversarial or investigative.200 And this was so even where property rights were 
involved.201 This new and widespread practice of using bureaucratic organs or officers to 
undertake duties which had hitherto been the responsibility of the regular courts of law 
constituted an obvious and very real threat to the inherent jurisdiction of judges of the 
lunacy court, a threat of which they were inevitably aware. The Lunacy Commission 
was indisputably a centralised board of control, and its introduction marked a clear shift 
of power from an exclusively judicial control of lunacy to an executive control, 
                                                 
194 Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 805, p. 461. 
195 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 28464 per 
Cozens-Hardy LJ. 
196 10 Law Quarterly Review 12 (1894) at 12. 
197 14 Law Quarterly Review 226 (1898) at 226. 
198 15 Law Quarterly Review 4 (1899) at 4. 
199 See above, p. 2 
200  See generally, Chantal Stebbings, Legal Foundations of Statutory Tribunals in Nineteenth Century 
England (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
201 Chantal Stebbings, ‘State Intervention and Private Property Rights in Victorian England’ in 
Hudson (ed.), New Perspectives on Family Law, Human Rights and the Home (Cavendish Publishing, 
2003), pp. 217-37. 
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embodied in the emergence of this new and powerful bureaucratic organ with 
responsibility for the vast majority of lunatics.  
The lunacy court was also vulnerable to the movement for the reform of the law 
and legal process which had as its central objective a uniform, efficient and rational legal 
system. That movement included two features of particular significance to the lunacy 
court: an unambiguous commitment to abolishing all specialist jurisdictions in 
independent courts202 and a determination to reform the procedures in all the regular 
courts to ensure speed and simplicity.203   
The lunacy court clearly exercised a specialist jurisdiction, and was accordingly 
vulnerable to the orthodox view that specialist jurisdictions undermined the 
organisation, order, classification and efficiency that characterised a rational legal 
system. The Judicature Commissioners in the latter years of the nineteenth century 
wanted to address the overlapping, conflicting, uncertain or anachronistic specialist 
jurisdictions which made a litigant’s life a misery and to propose reforms which would 
ensure the speedy, economical and satisfactory dispatch of judicial business.  They 
sought a more organised, uniform and consistent system. While the hostility towards 
special jurisdictions was directed primarily at local courts, there was a pervasive and 
official anxiety that specialisation could be taken too far within the regular court system. 
This led the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble Minded in 1908 to 
recommend that in the interests of increased efficiency and economy the lunacy 
jurisdiction exercised by the lunacy court be transferred to the Chancery Division of the 
High Court, and that the office of master in lunacy be abolished.204  The arguments were 
persuasive and cogent. Not only was the workload of the Chancery Division decreasing, 
and that of the lunacy court increasing,205 the work of the latter in caring for the mentally 
ill was closely analogous to the former’s work in caring for infants, and the superior 
processes and practices in the Chancery Division meant that it carried out its duties in 
this respect with far more speed and efficiency than the lunacy judges and officials. 206 
This was due to the Chancery judge enjoying a large staff under his control, a control 
that the judge in lunacy did not possess over the masters in lunacy,207 and the practice of 
                                                 
202 Second Report of the Judicature Commissioners, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1872) 
(631) xx 217. 
203 First Report of the Judicature Commissioners, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1868-69) 
(4130) xxv 1. 
204 Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 805, p. 461; Minutes of Evidence 
taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 28373, per  Cozens-Hardy LJ. 
205 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 29248 per W. H. 
Winterbotham, Official Solicitor 
206 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 28374 per 
Cozens-Hardy LJ. 
207 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 28375 per 
Cozens-Hardy LJ.  
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judicial sittings during the vacations.208 Furthermore, it was absurd for the increasing 
amount of trustee work, where a trustee became lunatic and legal arrangements such as 
the appointment of new trustees and the execution of vesting orders needed to be made, 
to be conducted by the lunacy court, as it was properly a matter for the Chancery 
Division.209   
  The movement for the reform of court procedures was equally hostile to the 
lunacy court. The provision of cheap, fast and effective justice was a political imperative 
for the Lord Derby’s Conservative ministry210 when popular demand for law reform 
reached its height in the middle years of the nineteenth century, and one to which Lord 
St Leonards was strongly committed, both in general and specifically in relation to 
lunacy. As a result, procedures in all the courts of law were being examined, notably 
that in the Court of Chancery where the delays and expense were notorious. The 
technicality, cost and extreme slowness of Chancery procedures were the subject of 
widespread informed and popular criticism, not least through the accurate portrayal of 
the suit of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House in 1853.  Contemporary 
commentators complained of ‘the deformities of our vaunted Jurisprudence’, the 
‘tragedy of a Chancery Suit’ and a process that was ‘incongruous, tortuous, and 
mischievous’.211 Procedures in the lunacy court were, if anything, even worse in these 
respects. The processes were archaic, technical, opaque and slow and suited mainly to 
the wealthy. And when Chancery processes were used in the post-inquisition stage, they 
were ill-suited in that they were designed to deal primarily with hostile litigant parties 
and to implement clear rights or processes, whereas in lunacy there was no litigation in 
the usual sense of the term, and the law was paternal and protective. A commentator in 
1854 described the Court of Chancery as ‘a sink of iniquity, which stinks in public 
opinion, and cannot be too soon superseded by some more simple and wholesome 
process for the protection of Chancery lunatics’.212 Despite being a separate department 
from 1842, the supervision of lunacy by the Lord Chancellor, the use of Chancery 
processes in the administration of estates subsequent to the inquisition, and the 
widespread use of the term ‘Chancery lunatic’ to describe lunatics so found by 
inquisition, strongly linked the lunacy court  with the Court of Chancery in the public 
mind. The former was clearly tainted by the faults of the latter and was, accordingly, 
vulnerable. 
In this interventionist and reformist context, the adoption of an exclusively 
judicial solution to the challenge of lunatics’ small estates was a singular achievement, 
                                                 
208 The lunacy department had no vacation sittings: Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal 
Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 28378-82 per Cozens-Hardy LJ.  
209 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 28374 per 
Cozens-Hardy LJ. 
210 ‘Lord Derby’s Policy as to Law Reform’, 16 Law Review and Quarterly Journal of British and 
Foreign Jurisprudence 1-32 (1852). 
211 ‘The First Report of the Chancery Commissioners’, 16 Law Review and Quarterly Journal of 
British and Foreign Jurisprudence 115-140 at p.115 (1852); First Report of the Chancery 
Commissioners, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1852) (1437) xxi 1. 
212 Richard Saumarez, An Address on the Laws of Lunacy for the Consideration of the Legislature (J. 
Ridgway, London, 1854) p. 16. 
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but the survival of the lunacy court as its specific instrument was remarkable. Not only 
did that court ensure that the lunacy jurisdiction was retained in the hands of a judicial 
authority, it also managed to keep its identity as a completely discrete department of the 
Court of Chancery in virtually all lunacy matters to administer it. It successfully 
overcame the legal system’s hostility to specialist jurisdictions and its determination to 
introduce uniform procedures, affirmed the need for judicial regulation of lunatics’ 
property and justified the single-minded exclusion of any additional or alternative organ 
of management and protection. That it retained its position as the proper and sole organ 
for the protection of the property of the mentally ill was due to the independence, 
resilience, astuteness and determination of the nineteenth century lunacy court .  
The judges and masters of the lunacy court were ‘strenuously of opinion that 
their isolated position should remain unimpaired’ and that the ‘judicial machinery 
should not be touched.’213 They understood that the need to assert themselves was 
imperative if they were to survive, and that only the distinctiveness and importance of 
their traditional role in the protection of property could prevent their court being 
subsumed either into the Chancery Division or in the bureaucratic regime of lunacy 
regulation. Perceiving their very survival as lying in the exclusive protection of 
property, they refused to compromise and steadfastly maintained their jurisdiction. 
They did so by making powerful and persuasive arguments for their supremacy in 
property matters to both the government and the public, and by being highly proactive 
in safeguarding their inherent jurisdiction. 
The lunacy court undoubtedly possessed intrinsic advantages which it promoted 
strongly in legal and political circles and which it pointedly emphasised in 
parliamentary debate, official inquiries and the press. It was clear that it possessed the 
necessary organisation and machinery to ensure that the property of the mentally ill, 
whatever its size, was protected so that it was used only for their care and preserved for 
their recovery, with all expenditure accounted for. Although the court had been left 
behind in the major restructuring of the legal system in the 1870s, and its procedures 
had not been fully reformed, there had been some improvements to meet popular 
demands, notably the simplification of the inquisition process and the introduction of 
receivership. The enactment of these genuinely beneficial reforms signified that the 
judges in lunacy were open to criticism and willing to co-operate with the new climate 
of law reform. The court also enjoyed the significant advantage in pragmatic and cost-
conscious government circles of being self-supporting, as it was financed entirely by fees 
and the lunacy percentage. It also showed itself willing to keep the management even of 
small estates, even though they were undoubtedly troublesome to supervise, especially 
where they consisted of small businesses which had to be managed or wound up, or 
where an estate was in disorder and litigation was necessary to sort it out. 214  
That it was a court of specialist jurisdiction was largely impossible to contest, but 
the judges of the lunacy court defended themselves robustly on the grounds of a need 
                                                 
213 Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 782, p. 451. 
214 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1859, session 1) (204) iii 75 q. 1276 per Francis Barlow, Master in Lunacy; Minutes of 
Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 29303 per W. H. Winterbotham, 
Official Solicitor. 
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for specialist expertise in such a substantively technical and esoteric branch of the law. 
They argued that the complexity of the lunacy law was such that a specialist court was 
necessary to administer it, a perception that the inaccessibility of the law reinforced. 
They convincingly maintained that a specialist jurisdiction dedicated to the protection of 
the insane, with unrivalled expertise and understanding of a difficult condition and its 
consequences, was essential to successful protection of the property of the mentally ill. 
This was a powerful argument, sufficiently so for the lunacy court successfully to elude 
the contemporary official opposition to specialist jurisdictions. Even when the Royal 
Commission of 1908 recommended the transfer of the lunacy jurisdiction to the 
Chancery Division,215 a repeated objection was that lunacy was such a specialised branch 
of law that it should be kept in a dedicated department, as a lack of expertise and 
experience would cause more delay and expense; indeed it would result in less 
efficiency not more.216 For the same reason the County Court was rejected as a major 
recipient of the lunacy jurisdiction.217 When the lunacy court agreed to the transfer of 
limited functions to the Chancery Division of the High Court,218 it was a pragmatic 
concession which did not undermine the main thrust of the judicial response to the 
perceived threats to their jurisdiction.  
A tangible threat came from the potentially encroaching Lunacy Commission. 
The possibility of tension and conflict between the two institutions, described as 
‘diametrically opposed’219 though working in the same field of activity, was clear.  And 
yet the lunacy court was able to maintain its position in relation to the bureaucratic body 
and avoid being undermined by it, primarily and precisely by using the different 
objectives, functions and cultures220 of the two institutions to its advantage and thereby 
diffusing any potential conflict on the question of property. With resilience and 
determination, the lunacy court demonstrated its unrivalled suitability for the protection 
of property. A measure of its success is that despite the history of provision for the 
mentally ill in the modern era being one of increased legislative regulation effected 
through organs of central government, and notwithstanding the Lunacy Commissioners’ 
undoubted independence, knowledge and experience, they were never seriously 
considered as a suitable alternative to the court for the protection of property. When in 
1860 the Select Committee on Lunatics discussed the transfer to the Lunacy 
Commissioners of responsibility for Chancery lunatics, it was only their cure, treatment 
and general supervision that were considered. There was no question of transferring any 
                                                 
215 Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 805 (p. 461). 
216 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 29445-47 per 
William Ambrose, Master in Lunacy. 
217 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble 
Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 qq. 30100, 30109 per 
Thomas Fischer, Master in Lunacy. Many commentators also believed the County Court was 
already overburdened with work. 
218 Namely vesting orders where lunatics were involved. 
219 Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 782, p. 451. 
220 D. J. Mellett, ‘Bureaucracy and Mental Illness: the Commissioners in Lunacy 1845-90’, 25 
Medical History 221-50 (1981). 
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jurisdiction over lunatics’ property from the judicial to the bureaucratic authority. When 
the Lunacy Commissioners were replaced by the Board of Control in 1913 as the 
authority of central government in lunacy regulation,221 no changes of principle were 
made in relation to the protection of lunatics’ property: the judicial solution remained 
the only one.   
The reasons why the Lunacy Commissioners were never considered as suitable 
for the protection of the property of the mentally ill were several. The commission was 
created as an advisory body, without executive functions. The commissioners inspected, 
commented, recommended, revealed abuses and spread good practice, but from their 
inception they were denied any powers to protect the property of lunatics not so found 
by inquisition. They themselves accepted the perception of the court as the proper 
protector of lunatics’ property, and their own chairman said that they should not ‘trench 
upon [the court’s] rights’ as such.222 They admitted their lack of experience and 
knowledge of the administration of property,223 and the widely accepted view was that 
to give the commissioners the power to deal with lunatics’ property would lead to 
confusion and tend against economy.224 It was also clear that the commissioners had 
extensive duties with no spare capacity for any new responsibilities. Indeed, in the first 
decade of the twentieth century it was officially acknowledged that their work had 
become too extensive for the six commissioners, and that the traditional model of central 
control and local supervision of asylums was failing, leading to a recommendation for a 
complete reorganisation. The commission’s constitution, its members’ own diffidence, 
and the tacit acceptance by the court that the commission was better equipped to protect 
the persons of certified lunatics in state asylums, combined to avoid any undue impact 
of state intervention on the exercise of the lunacy court’s jurisdiction. The two 
frameworks for the regulation of lunatics interacted smoothly to the satisfaction of both 
parties in relation to property matters.  In maintaining its role as protector of the 
property of incapacitated individuals in the face of the lunacy commission, the court’s 
determination resonated with contemporary public concerns. It supported the popular 
distrust of the intervention of the state into the private affairs of individuals, most 
notably with questions of private property.225 
Beyond astutely engaging with the political imperatives of law reform and state 
intervention as far as it could, the lunacy court  asserted its position by proactively and 
strongly defending its own inherent jurisdiction, which had always been perceived 
principally in terms of property.  The judges’ awareness of their vulnerability, and the 
steps they took to address it, are clearly demonstrated by the landmark decision in Re 
                                                 
221 Mental Deficiency Act 1913 (3 & 4 Geo V c. 28) ss. 21, 22.  This had been recommended in 1908: 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4202) xxxix 159 at para. 806 (p .462). 
222 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunatics, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (1860) (495) xxii 349 at q. 415 per the Earl of Shaftesbury.  
223 Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, qq. 9463-65 per Charles Phillips, Commissioner in Lunacy. 
224 Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1908) (4218) xxxvii 455 q. 28464 per 
Cozens-Hardy LJ. 
225 See generally, Chantal Stebbings, Legal Foundations of Statutory Tribunals in Nineteenth Century 
England (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 91-93. 
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Earl of Sefton in 1898 in which a lunatic sought permission to alienate a very small 
portion of his estate in order to safeguard the whole, much larger, portion. 226 The court 
there directly addressed the juxtaposition and interrelationship of the two strands of 
jurisdiction, inherent and statutory, and affirmed its position primarily by adopting a 
flexible approach to its interpretation of the statutory lunacy code. Instead of adopting 
the traditional strict English approach to statutory interpretation, it preferred a liberal 
approach and looked to the overall purpose of the legislation. A strict construction of the 
statute De Prerogativa Regis, which was a prohibiting enactment, would have been fatal 
to the lunatic’s claim. Instead the court adopted an unprecedented wide interpretation of 
the 1324 statute to ensure that its own ancient inherent jurisdiction was not inhibited, 
and a very narrow construction of the Lunacy Act 1890 to show that it did not apply in 
its terms to the situation then before it.  In so doing the court held that the Lunacy Act 
1890 was merely declaratory of the ancient jurisdiction, that it was not exhaustive, and 
that it did not limit the inherent jurisdiction of the court. It was an enabling Act, and was 
not restrictive, and did not supersede the inherent jurisdiction. The court thereby 
unambiguously affirmed the existence, scope and vigour of the court’s ancient inherent 
delegated jurisdiction in lunacy, derived from the royal prerogative, of which only parts 
had been given statutory expression. It existed apart from the express legislative powers, 
and it was not limited or curtailed by those express powers. This finding was possible 
precisely because the scope of the court’s inherent jurisdiction had never been defined. 
As Lord Lindley MR observed, its limits  ‘fortunately have never been so accurately laid 
down as to bind the court to the very narrow limits to which the words [of an Act227], 
unless very general indeed, would confine its jurisdiction’.228  This adoption of a 
strikingly liberal approach to the interpretation of an ancient disabling statute, the strict   
interpretation of modern enabling statutes, and the affirmation of an inherent 
jurisdiction in lunacy that was limited only by the need to exercise it for the benefit of 
the lunatic, constituted an unambiguous and effective response to the perceived threat 
to the Lord Chancellor of losing his lunacy jurisdiction to the state apparatus.229 
The lunacy court was astute in its self-promotion. In demonstrating the wide 
scope and depth of its inherent jurisdiction it showed that where the statutory 
jurisdiction was inadequate in some way, as actually occurred in the Sefton case itself, 
the inherent jurisdiction could be called into play, and so ‘by hook or by crook almost 
any transaction which is for the patient’s benefit can be sanctioned’.230 The court 
portrayed its inherent jurisdiction as the real friend of the lunatic, the regime that 
enabled transactions to be effected for his benefit, and the court as the natural and most 
effective protector of a lunatic’s property, and indeed that in the field of property 
holding, the Lord Chancellor’s protection was unsurpassed. In so doing, the court 
implicitly recognised the debate within lunacy law regarding the absence of any legal 
protection for the property of poorer lunatics, and reinforced an awareness that a 
                                                 
226 Re Earl of Sefton [1898] 2 Ch 378. 
227 Words included in 67 LJ Ch 518 at 523.  
228 (1898) 78 LT 765 at 768 (Lindley MR). 
229 See generally W.R. Cornish and G de N. Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1989) pp. 69-71. 
230 Raymond Jennings, ‘Jurisdiction in Lunacy’ 23 Modern Law Review 421-424 at 422 n. (1960).  
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significant growth in the number of individuals officially recognised as insane 
demanded clear and robust provision for the safeguarding of their property.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The modern legal framework for the protection of the property of the mentally ill was 
created in the Victorian period, when the arguments for adopting and reinforcing the 
judicial solution were accepted, implemented and embedded in the modern legal 
framework. The challenge to the legal order was considerable; the easy and obvious 
solution was a bureaucratic one, but the one that was adopted, retained and reinforced 
was the judicial one. And, furthermore, established in the form of a specialised court of 
law. The evidence shows that the ancient jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in lunacy, 
while accessible to patients of small property in theory but not in practice, was in 
principle a highly effective organ of protection if the will to reform its procedural defects 
was present. The Victorian legislature responded, and over fifty years effected a gradual 
reform of the established inquisition process for the protection of all lunatics’ property 
and introduced some substantive reforms specifically directed to small estates. 
The development of a regime for the protection of small estates of the mentally ill 
was the product of a number of factors which came together with an unprecedented 
intensity in the nineteenth century. They included the need for state intervention; the 
reforming agenda of the Victorian legislators in relation to the law, legal process and 
legal system; judicial conservatism; a complex branch of law dominated by practice; an 
archaic specialised jurisdiction; a new statutory jurisdiction; advances in medical 
science; the fundamental incapacity of the subjects of the law unable to articulate their 
needs and demands; and, finally, a law which put the significance of individual wealth 
central to the consequences of lunacy. The interrelation of these factors created a 
momentum of its own, and revealed a number of imperatives, influences and attitudes, 
but the catalyst which produced a positive dynamic leading to a reformed legal regime 
for the protection of the property of the mentally ill was the determination of the lunacy 
court jealously to guard its jurisdiction over property and to ensure it was not violated 
either by the state apparatus or by another judicial body. Together they combined to 
resist any contrary forces and create a strong and accessible protection for small estates.  
It has been seen that the substantive reforms for the protection of small estates 
were few and slow in coming. The evidence suggests four main reasons for this 
hesitancy. First, the commitment to resolving the specific problem of the smaller 
properties of the middle and working class mentally ill was subsumed by the overall 
movement to ensure that the judicial solution was the one adopted for the protection of 
all property. Secondly, the legislature had more pressing concerns to address in relation 
to lunacy, primarily to ensure that the population of pauper lunatics was protected from 
physical abuse and properly cared for and to do so by introducing a raft of legislation 
and the creation of a new bureaucratic body. A writer on lunacy in 1892 observed that 
he would not deal with matters relating to the property of a lunatic as they were ‘not 
within the scope of a popular treatise’.231 And thirdly, while the public concern was 
                                                 
231 Daniel Chamier, Wilson’s Legal Handy Book on the Lunacy Law, (Effingham Wilson & Co., 1892) 
p. 49. 
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indubitably with issues of personal liberty, it was directed to the liberty of the person 
rather than freedom to deal with property.  And so throughout the nineteenth century, 
the principal informed criticism of the lunacy laws was primarily in relation to the 
possibility of wrongful detention of sane individuals who were sane as a result of the 
manipulation of the law by unscrupulous relatives and the law’s inherent inadequacy in 
this respect.232 This imperative was regarded as of prime importance, and accordingly 
dominated over any concern for lunatic’s property.  
Fourthly, the reforms were slow because, as a class, the mentally ill were a weak 
constituency.  Due to their medical incapacity every aspect of the law and its 
administration was determined by others in the perceived best interests of those 
subjected to it, with no articulation of their needs by the users themselves. As such, it 
was a supremely paternalistic branch of the law, and one which was highly susceptible 
to current social attitudes and medical theories. While the judicial protection of property 
was accessible to the very wealthy Chancery lunatics, and their friends and families 
were generally in a position to articulate and press for any desirable legal reforms, and 
pauper lunatics were championed by the humanitarian and evangelical forces within 
Victorian society and politics,233 the middle class lunatics of small property had no 
obvious lobby to ensure their particular position was not ignored.  
While these four factors undoubtedly hindered the speed of reform and the 
adoption of the judicial solution, they did not prevent it, partly because the issue of the 
protection of property was relevant to them all: it concerned lunatics who were paupers 
for the purposes of lunacy law but were not destitute; it was an aspect of personal 
freedom in the wider sense; and it undoubtedly directly affected wealthier lunatics who 
were subject to an unacceptably expensive system of protection. And, furthermore, the 
paternalistic ethos underlying the place of the mentally ill within English law strongly 
promoted a judicial solution to the legal protection of their small estates, primarily due 
to natural parallels drawn with the Court of Chancery’s protective jurisdiction over 
infants. To adopt the judicial solution of the lunacy court reflected a long standing and 
intense paternalism, an ethos which reached its height in the early twentieth century 
when the desirability of  judicial control of the property of ‘prodigals’ was debated, and 
the line between bad judgment and lunacy became increasingly narrow.  
The factor which could have entirely prevented the adoption of the judicial 
solution, namely the powerful ideology of state intervention, ultimately proved neither a 
viable competitor nor a material obstacle, but in 1845 it constituted a major threat in 
principle to the very existence of the lunacy court and a robust response and constant 
vigilance as to the erosion of its jurisdiction were required. The exclusion of the lunacy 
                                                 
232 Richard Saumarez, An Address on the Laws of Lunacy for the Consideration of the Legislature (J. 
Ridgway, London, 1854) pp. 1-2. Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental 
Disorder, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1926) (2700) xiii 373 at 401-5; Evidence of James 
Billington, Secretary of the Lunacy Law Amendment Society in Minutes of Evidence before the 
Select Committee on Lunacy Law, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1877 (373) xiii 1, qq. 
6899-7191. See too Peter McCandless, ‘Dangerous to Themselves and Others: the Victorian Debate 
over the Prevention of Wrongful Confinement’ 23 The Journal of British Studies 84-104 (1983). See 
too ‘Reports of the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law’, 9 Law Review & Quarterly 
Journal of British & Foreign Jurisprudence 313-336 at 318-19 (1848-49). 
233 See generally Kathleen Jones, Lunacy, Law and Conscience 1744-1845 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd, London, 1955) pp. 66-68. 
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commissioners from any material involvement with lunatics’ property and the 
recognition of the Lord Chancellor in the bureaucratic framework as the appointer of the 
commissioners and the formal recipient of their reports, served to diffuse any potential 
tensions and conflicts between the executive and judicial authority. As a result the 
interaction between the state’s regulation of lunacy and the jurisdiction of the judicial 
authorities in relation to the property of the mentally ill was easy, at a time when 
fundamental principles of jurisdiction in this field of social and legal development were 
being formulated. The evidence provides an insight into the judicial system’s response 
to state intervention in the field of lunacy. It shows the judges were aware of the threat 
that state intervention could bring to even ancient established jurisdictions. It does not, 
however, show the judges to be a force that aimed to hinder centralisation in the 
nineteenth century, rather that they were pragmatic and saw they had to work with the 
bureaucratic authority. The judiciary’s vested interests certainly marked the 
relationship, and the Lord Chancellor, judges and masters were clearly protecting their 
jurisdiction.  
Judicial attitudes were undoubtedly a material factor in determining the final 
shape of the legal regime in lunacy: the lunacy court’s refusal to contemplate any 
solution other than the judicial one and to maintain the inquisition when its abolition 
would have resulted in a simpler, more accessible and less anachronistic system,234 could 
be construed as judicial conservatism. That would suggest the mentally ill may have 
suffered as a result of what could be perceived as judicial manoeuvring driven by the 
vested interests of the judges, either denying them effective protection or delaying its 
introduction. The response of the judges, however, could equally be described as judicial 
determination to maintain an ancient jurisdiction in the firm belief that it offered the best 
possible protection to the mentally ill, that it constituted an effective response to the 
needs of poor and middle class patients, and recognised the public confidence in this 
solution. 
Finally, the legal framework of lunacy law in relation to the protection of the 
property of the mentally ill is far more than an arid official aspect of the history of the 
care of the mentally ill of lunacy. The attention of nineteenth century reformers and 
governments was directed to the pressing question of the management of pauper 
lunatics, and modern scholarship has concentrated on that discourse and its institutional 
implementation and social impact.235 There has been a tendency to perceive the legal 
framework of property protection as relevant only to the small class of wealthy lunatics 
and as such of less importance to the dominant theme of state intervention in mental 
health. However this study has shown that in the nineteenth century the legal 
                                                 
234Theobald regarded the maintenance of the inquisition in 1845 and again in 1890 as missed 
opportunities: Sir Henry Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy, (London: Stevens and Sons, 1924) 
pp. 71, 80. 
235 See for example Peter Bartlett, The Poor Law of Lunacy (Leicester University Press, London and 
Washington 1999); Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe (eds), Insanity, Institutions and Society 1800-
1914 (Routledge, London and New York, 1999); Andrew Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions: 
Madness and Society in Britain 1700-1900 (Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1993; 
Leonard D. Smith, Cure, Comfort and Safe Custody (Leicester University Press, London and New 
York 1999); Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe, The Politics of Madness (Routledge, London and 
New York 2006). See too Clive Unsworth, ‘Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry’s “Golden Age”’, 13 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 479-507. 
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framework for the protection of property was a significant element within the political 
and popular debate on the question of lunacy, and as a construct in its own right with its 
own tensions and dynamics, it was an important formative factor in shaping the policy 
with respect to the care of the mentally ill. The recognition that special compulsory 
powers were necessary to protect the property of patients when they could not manage 
their own affairs,236 that this protection should be easily accessible to the mentally ill 
with small properties, and that it should be implemented by a specialist court of law, 
prevailed with remarkable consistency throughout the nineteenth century and to the 
present day.237 The fundamental structure and authority of robust and highly accessible 
judicial protection with minimal or no jurisdiction over the person forms the core and 
imperative of today’s legal framework for the care of the property of the mentally ill.238 
 
                                                 
236 Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers (1956-57) (169) xvi 1 at para. 136, p. 49. 
237 It was still the view in the 1930s: see the preface to Gerald E. Mills and Ronald W. Poyser,  
Lunacy Practice (London, Butterworth & Co., 1934) p. v. See too Mental Health Acts 1959, 1983. 
238 See Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Halsbury’s Laws of England, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005), 
vol. 30(2) paras 672-764. 
